Two Essays on the Sell-side Financial Analysts by Liu, Xi
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
January 2012
Two Essays on the Sell-side Financial Analysts
Xi Liu
University of South Florida, xliu3@usf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons, American Studies Commons, and the Finance and Financial
Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Liu, Xi, "Two Essays on the Sell-side Financial Analysts" (2012). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4129
Two Essays on the Sell-side Financial Analysts 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Xi Liu 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
Department of Finance 
College of Business 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
Co-Major Professor: Daniel J. Bradley, Ph.D. 
Co-Major Professor: Christos Pantzalis, Ph.D. 
Delroy M. Hunter, Ph.D. 
Jianping Qi, Ph.D. 
 
 
Date of Approval: 
May 07, 2012 
 
 
 
Keywords: 
Analysts’ Recommendations, Contrarian Revision, Market Efficiency, 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts, Post-Earnings Announcement Drift  
 
Copyright © 2012, Xi Liu 
 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I thank the members of my Dissertation Committee: Dr. Hunter, Dr. Qi, and 
especially my Co-Chairs Dr. Bradley and Dr. Pantzalis for their inspiration, guidance, 
and support throughout the writing process. I owe additional gratitude to Dr. Bradley for 
the countless hours spent working with me. 
This dissertation has benefited from the advice of my dissertation committee, as 
well as the advice of the entire Department of Finance at the University of South Florida. 
It has also benefitted from the comments of conference participants at the Eastern 
Finance Association 2011 and 2012 annual meetings. In addition, it has benefitted from 
the comments of seminar participants at Ohio University. All remaining errors are mine. 
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
List of Tables ...........................................................................................................................iii 
 
List of Figures  .......................................................................................................................... v 
 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... vi 
 
The Information Role of Analysts’ Contrarian Revisions ..................................................... 1 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
2. Literature review and hypotheses ......................................................................... 4 
3. Data Sources and Sample Selection ................................................................... 10 
A. Sample Construction ............................................................................... 10 
B. Define trending and contrarian recommendations ................................ 11 
4. Empirical Tests .................................................................................................... 12 
A. The information role of contrarian revisions......................................... 12 
B. Multivariate regressions ......................................................................... 16 
C. Determinants of contrarian recommendations ...................................... 18 
D. Trading costs ........................................................................................... 19 
E. Regulation FD ......................................................................................... 20 
5. Robustness Tests ................................................................................................. 21 
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 23 
7. References ............................................................................................................ 25 
 
Market Reaction to Earnings When Investors Disagree ...................................................... 42 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 42 
2. Market Reaction to Earnings Announcement .................................................... 47 
A. The role of individual investors ............................................................. 47 
B. Intuition behind the model ..................................................................... 48 
C. A simple example of model’s implications ........................................... 48 
3. Empirical tests of model implications ................................................................ 51 
A. Proxy for divergence of investors’ opinion ........................................... 51 
B. Sample construction ................................................................................ 53 
C. Trading volume at the time of earnings announcement ....................... 55 
D. Earnings forecast errors .......................................................................... 56 
4. Empirical Tests of Model Implications .............................................................. 59 
A. The relation between divergence of investors’ opinions and the 
immediate market reaction to earnings surprise ................................... 59 
B. The relation between divergence of investors’ opinions and the 
Post Earnings Announcement Drift ....................................................... 60 
C. The relation between divergence of investors’ opinions and the 
trading volume at the earnings announcement. ..................................... 62 
ii 
 
D. Regression Analysis ................................................................................ 63 
E. Robustness Tests ..................................................................................... 65 
5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 69 
6. References ............................................................................................................ 71 
7. Appendix 1: Static market equilibrium model................................................... 88 
8. Appendix 2: Model structure ............................................................................ 100 
iii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics ........................................................................................ 28 
 
Table 1.2: Distributions of analysts’ revisions across years......................................... 29 
 
Table 1.3: Buy-and-hold mean abnormal returns around analysts’ revisions ............. 30 
 
Table 1.4: Buy-and-hold mean abnormal returns for different size deciles ................ 31 
 
Table 1.5: Stock price response to recommendation revisions with different 
timing with respect to earnings announcements ......................................... 33 
 
Table 1.6: OLS regressions ............................................................................................ 35 
 
Table 1.7: Probit regressions .......................................................................................... 36 
 
Table 1.8: Trading profitability after considering the bid ask spread .......................... 37 
 
Table 1.9: Difference in the market reaction to analysts’ revisions before and 
after Reg FD .................................................................................................. 38 
 
Table 1.10: Robustness test for different definitions of trending/contrarian................. 40 
 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics ........................................................................................ 75 
 
Table 2.2: Earnings forecast errors from whisper and analysts’ consensus 
forecasts  ........................................................................................................ 76 
 
Table 2.3: Divergence of investors’ opinions and the immediate market 
reaction to earnings surprise ......................................................................... 78 
 
Table 2.4: Divergence of investors’ opinions and the Post-Earnings 
Announcement Drift ..................................................................................... 79 
 
Table 2.5: Divergence of investors’ opinions and the trading volume at the 
earnings announcement ................................................................................. 80 
 
Table 2.6: Regression analysis of model implications ................................................. 81 
 
iv 
 
Table 2.7: Two-stage least square regression results .................................................... 82 
 
Table 2.8: Regression results for more recent analyst consensus forecasts ................ 83 
 
Table 2.9: Robustness tests ............................................................................................. 84 
 
  
v 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Post upward revisions short-term buy-and-hold mean abnormal 
returns ............................................................................................................ 41 
 
Figure 1.2: Post downward revisions short-term buy-and-hold mean abnormal 
returns ............................................................................................................ 41 
 
Figure 2.1: Model Implications ....................................................................................... 86 
 
Figure 2.2: Stock price movements around earnings announcements .......................... 87 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vi 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the first essay titled “The Information Role of Analysts’ Contrarian Revisions,” 
I study a special group of revisions: contrarian revisions, defined as recommendation 
changes that are inconsistent with sizable stock price movements during the past week. I 
find that contrarian revisions are relatively more informative than trending revisions. In 
particular, contrarian revisions are associated with a both statistically and economically 
larger post-announcement drift. I also find contrarian downgrades are less likely to be 
issued by all-star analysts and analysts with more experience. After implementation of 
Regulation RD, the market reaction to contrarian revisions issued by all-stars 
significantly decreases, indicating private information contained in contrarian 
recommendations has declined. Overall, our results suggest analyst recommendations are 
important information sources for market participants. 
In the second essay titled “Market Reaction to Earnings When Investors 
Disagree,” I investigate how the divergence of opinions between individual and 
institutional investors affects stock price movements around public news events, 
specifically earnings announcements. I use a discrete static market equilibrium model to 
illustrate that divergence of investors’ opinions has a significant impact on stock price 
movements around earnings announcements. Specifically, the divergence of opinion has 
a negative relation with the immediate market reaction but a positive relation with the 
subsequent stock price drift. I also investigate trading volume around earnings 
vii 
 
announcements to explore how traders respond to changes in the divergence of investors’ 
opinions. Empirical evidence supports the model implications and indicates 
announcement trading volume decreases inversely to the divergence of opinions. 
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THE INFORMATION ROLE OF ANALYSTS’ CONTRARIAN REVISIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After Fossil Inc.'s 25 percent jump over the last six trading days, an analyst said 
the watchmaker's stock price is unlikely to rise much further in the near term and 
downgraded the stock to “Hold”. (The Associated Press (Oct 31, 2011))  
 
Analysts are conventionally viewed as important information agents who convey 
positive/negative information through recommendation upward/downward revisions. 
However this widely accepted view has been challenged by recent studies. On the one 
hand, individual analyst recommendation revisions are considered informative because 
they are usually accompanied by corresponding market reactions at the time of 
announcement (see Green (2006); Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2006); Stickel (1995); 
Womack (1996); and others). This abnormal stock performance lasts for weeks or even 
months after revisions are publicly announced (Womack (1996)). On the other hand, 
many papers have documented different types of behavioral biases in analyst 
recommendations which call into question the information role of analysts (see Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980); Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000); Hong and Kubik (2003); Trueman 
(1994); Welch (2000); and others). More recently, Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) suggest 
analyst recommendations piggyback on current news and are therefore information free. 
However, a recent study by Bradley, Clarke, Lee, and Ornthanali (2011) finds that the 
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I/B/E/S time stamp is delayed and the findings in Atlinkilic and Hansen (2009) could be 
the result of such time stamp delay. 
To better understand the information role of analyst revisions, this paper studies a 
special group of revisions: revisions that are issued right after the stock price has 
experienced sizeable changes. I define a contrarian revision as a recommendation change 
that is a) issued after the stock price has experienced a sizeable movement, and b) 
contradicting the price movement. Similarly, trending revisions are defined as 
recommendation changes that are in line with past stock price sizeable movement, i.e. 
analysts downgrade if the firm underperformed in the past week and upgrade if the firm 
outperformed. Though prior research has examined the timing and value of analyst 
recommendation revisions (see Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004)) and the positive feedback 
effect of momentum recommendations (see Muslu and Xue (2010)), to the best of my 
knowledge, there have been few studies, if any, focusing on contrarian recommendation 
revisions and their information role. It is this void that I attempt to fill. 
I focus on contrarian recommendation revisions for two reasons. First, contrarian 
revisions are unlikely to be the product of analyst herding since they contradict with the 
most recent stock price changes, and require courage to stand against the crowd. Second, 
contrarian recommendations are least likely due to analysts’ piggybacking on recent 
news, because piggybacking requires recommendations in line with recent news and 
market reactions. Based on these thoughts, similar to the comparison of bold versus 
herding recommendations (Clement and Tse (2005)), I hypothesize that contrarian 
recommendations are more informative than trending recommendations. 
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To completely alleviate the concerns for confounding news events at 
announcement and I/B/E/S time stamp accuracy, my focus is on the short term post 
recommendation drift starting one day after revision. In my sample of 1994 to 2009, I 
find that contrarian revisions have larger magnitude of short term drift compared to 
trending revisions. In days (1, 2) and (1, 5), contrarian upgrades (downgrades) experience 
a market-adjusted return of 0.57 percent and 0.84 percent (-0.55 percent and -0.82 
percent), respectively. This is significantly larger than the corresponding returns for 
trending upgrades (downgrades) of 0.27 percent and 0.43 percent (-0.23 percent and -0.48 
percent), respectively. This result is robust to analyst-specific characteristics in a 
multivariate framework.  
Revisions containing more information content are expected to be issued by All-
Stars and experienced analysts. Surprisingly, I find that they are less likely to issue 
contrarian downgrades but analysts from small brokerage firms are more likely to issue 
them. One possible explanation for this unexpected result could be that the affiliation 
with covered firms are usually stronger for all-star and more experienced analysts, but 
analysts from smaller brokerage houses are not. If this is the case, all-stars would be more 
reluctant to issue a downgrade on a client firm, particularly if it goes against market 
trends.  
Last but not least, I examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure's (Reg FD) 
on the information content of contrarian revisions. On August 15, 2000, the SEC adopted 
Reg FD to address the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies 
and other issuers. It aims to promote the full and fair disclosure and to eliminate 
"selective disclosure" between a company and the analysts who cover it. Many studies 
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find that Reg FD has a significant impact on the information content of analyst 
recommendations. For example, Gintschel and Markov (2003) show that the absolute 
price impact of information disseminated by analysts dampened in the post-FD period. 
Cornett et al. (2007) find that within a 4-year window, stock price reactions to analysts’ 
recommendation revisions decreased significantly after the passage of Reg FD. I use the 
difference in difference analysis to examine the pre- and post-FD changes in the 
difference between contrarian recommendations and trending recommendations. I find 
that the difference declines significantly after the Reg FD, indicating that the private 
information contained in contrarian recommendations has declined relative to trending 
recommendations. Taken as a whole, all the results lead to the conclusion that analyst 
recommendations contain important information. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as following: Section II discusses related 
literature and develops testing hypotheses; Section III describes sample and data sources; 
Section IV presets empirical test framework and results; Section V illustrates the results 
from robustness tests; and Section VI concludes. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
As information intermediaries, analysts convey information through 
recommendation revisions. For instance, Stickel (1995) finds that upgrades/downgrades 
in individual analyst recommendations are accompanied by positive/negative returns at 
the time of their announcement. Green (2006) finds that purchasing (selling) stocks 
following upgrades (downgrades) results in average two-day returns of 1.02% (1.50%) 
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after controlling for transaction costs. Irvine et al. (2007) document abnormally high 
institutional trading volume and buying beginning five days before recommendations are 
publicly released. Womack (1996) also documents post-recommendation stock price drift 
and finds it lasts up to one month for upgrades and six months for downgrades.  
Many studies use the magnitude of short-term stock price changes as a proxy for 
the informativeness of recommendation revisions. For example, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 
(2004) use (0, 2) three-day market adjusted excess returns as their proxy and find 
different patterns for upgrade and downgrade revisions relative to earnings announcement 
days. However, a recent study by Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) uses a much shorter time 
interval of 40 minutes around recommendation announcement as their proxy and find that 
recommendation revisions piggyback on recent news and therefore are almost 
information free. One of the current paper’s objectives is to investigate whether 
contrarian recommendations, a subset of analysts’ revisions, are more informative than 
trending revisions. Following Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004), I use a (0, 2) three-day 
interval as well as short term drifts starting from one day after revision as my proxy to 
examine the informativeness of recommendations. The main hypotheses are: 
H1: Contrarian recommendation revisions are associated with larger initial 
market reactions and have larger post-recommendation drift than trending 
recommendations. 
However, in most cases, a recommendation is the outcome of a tradeoff between 
reputation (which is based on accuracy) and bias (see Hong and Kubik (2003)). 
Therefore, both academicians and practitioners have questioned the view that analysts’ 
recommendations are simple valuation decisions. One indication of these conflicting 
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interests is the well-known upward bias in the distribution of recommendations 
documented by Stickel (1995) and others. Herding toward the consensus based on little 
information among analysts is another possible source of bias that affects analyst 
recommendation accuracy (see Trueman (1994); Welch (2000); Hong et al. (2000)). 
These arguments are supported by Block (1999), who survey analysts and report on the 
extremely low reliance on valuation methods in the formation of stock recommendations. 
Therefore trending revisions are similar but often parallel to herding revisions. For 
example, analysts may revise their recommendations because of revisions issued by other 
analysts or because of recent price movements. 
The literature finds that investor sentiment is one of the driving forces of market 
under-/overreaction (see Barberis et al. (1998); Hong et al. (1999); Hong et al. (2000)). 
Jegadeesh et al (1995) find that stock prices overreact to firm-specific information, but 
react with delay to common factors and most of the contrarian profits are due to stock 
price overreaction. If analysts can accurately identify price movements caused by 
overreaction, their contrarian revisions will be more informative. Since it requires 
courage to issue contrarian revisions and they are associated with greater risks, analysts 
who issue contrarian recommendations are expected to be more competent and 
experienced than those issuing trending recommendations. This notion is indirectly 
confirmed by Muslu and Xue (2010) who find that momentum recommendations are 
more likely to be issued by less talented and less experienced analysts. Consequently, 
hypothesis 2 is about contrarian analyst characteristics: 
H2: Analysts who issue contrarian recommendation revisions are more competent 
than those issuing trending recommendation revisions.  
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Another potentially interesting and practical question is whether investors can 
profit from analysts’ recommendations (sometimes called “stock picks”), which is also a 
long-debated question. On the one hand, if stock markets are truly semi-strong efficient 
as empirical studies have suggested, it should be impossible for investors to make profits 
from trading based on the analysts’ revisions because the information is available to the 
public and is disseminated to all investors at the same time (Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980)). On the other hand, millions of dollars are spent every year on security analyses; 
investors are willing to pay thousands of dollars every year for subscriptions, implying 
that brokerage firms and their clients believe analyst recommendations contain profitable 
information. A series of papers have also documented abnormal trading activity as well 
as price movements around analyst recommendation revisions (see Womack (1996); 
Green (2006); Irvine (2007); etc.). 
Barber et al (2001) is one of the studies that support the notion that trading on 
recommendations is not profitable. They use consensus recommendations as the criteria 
for stock picking and find significantly positive/negative abnormal return for most/least 
favorable consensus recommendations. However, since high trading levels are required to 
capture the excess returns generated, substantial transactions costs make the abnormal net 
returns not reliably greater than zero. Nevertheless, as they indicate in their paper, their 
findings do not necessarily mean trading on analyst recommendations is always 
unprofitable. 
As suggested by the papers documenting the profitability of trading on analyst 
recommendations, there are two possible ways to gain abnormal returns through trading 
based on analysts’ revisions: “good timing” and “picking the right recommendations to 
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follow”. For example, Green (2006) finds the intraday profitability based on analyst 
revisions can be significantly enhanced by early access to stock recommendations and 
quick transaction following recommendation changes. The abnormal two-day return in 
Green (2006) is significant even after controlling for transaction costs. Irvine et al (2007) 
finds evidence that institutional traders receive tips regarding the contents of forthcoming 
analysts’ reports, and start trading five days before recommendations are publicly 
released. Therefore, in order to make an abnormal profit from trading on 
recommendations, it requires at least an instantaneous response if not front-running the 
recommendation announcements without distinguishing which type of revisions are 
profitable to follow. Otherwise, trading on recommendations may not be profitable or 
even harmful to investors’ wealth (Jegadeesh et al (2004)).  
This paper’s findings should be especially of interest to investment practitioners 
because the trading strategies investigated here require neither access to insider 
information about upcoming recommendation revisions, nor instantaneous purchase after 
the revision announcement. In essence, this study is more about identifying which kind of 
revisions are profitable to follow and which are not. The results indicate that the 
profitability remains significant even after controlling for transaction costs such as the bid 
ask spread. The third hypothesis in this paper is listed as: 
H3: Trading on contrarian recommendation revisions can generate both 
economically and statistically significant positive returns after controlling for transaction 
costs. 
Finally, I study the impact of Regulation FD's (Reg FD) on the information 
content of analyst recommendation revisions. On August 15, 2000, the SEC adopted 
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Regulation FD to address the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded 
companies and other issuers. It aims to promote the full and fair disclosure and so as to 
eliminate "selective disclosure" between a company and the analysts who cover it. A 
series of papers have looked at the effect of Reg FD on the information environment 
around the regulation change. Many studies find that Reg FD has a significant impact on 
the informativeness of analyst recommendations. For example, Gintschel and Markov 
(2003) show that the absolute price impact of information disseminated by analysts 
dampened in the post-FD period. Cornett et al. (2007) find that within 4 year window, 
stock price reactions to analysts’ recommendation revisions decreased significantly after 
the passage of Reg FD.  
A number of studies also show that the impact of Reg FD has been to increase 
voluntary public disclosures. For example, Brown et al. (2002), Bushee et al. (2002) and 
Heflin et al. (2003) find higher frequencies of public disclosure and increased price 
impact from public disclosure after Reg FD. Jorion et al. (2005) find that the 
informational effect of credit rating downgrades and upgrades is much larger post-Reg 
FD, because Reg FD still allows the disclosure of non-public information to credit rating 
agencies. 
If the information content of contrarian revisions comes from insider information 
shared by management, then we would find the difference of market reaction to 
contrarian revisions and to trending revisions significantly decreases after the Reg FD. 
Thus, my last testable hypothesis, H4: 
H4: The market response to contrarian recommendation revisions will be lower 
post-Reg FD. 
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3. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
A.  Sample Construction 
The testing sample is an intersection of several data sets. I obtain sell-side 
analysts’ stock recommendations and firms’ quarterly actual earnings as well as 
consensus forecasts during the period of January 1994 to December 2009 from 
Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Daily stock return data during the same 
period are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Firm 
specific financial information is obtained from the Compustat annual data set. As I use 
financial data reported in the previous fiscal year, the Compustat sample ranges between 
the fiscal year of 1993 and 2008.  
I/B/E/S recommendations are originally coded as follows: 1 = strong buy, 2 = 
buy, 3 = hold, 4 = sell, 5 = strong sell. For the purpose of easy interpretation of results, I 
recoded recommendations based on an inverted scale ranging from 1= strong sell and 
5=strong buy. There are a total of 515,571 observations in the I/B/E/S file. 
Recommendations can be upgrades, downgrades, reiterations or coverage 
initiations. Because the focus of this study is to determine how individual analysts 
respond to significant stock price changes, the testing sample has to consist of directional 
revisions relative to the analyst’s most recent recommendations on the same company. I 
excluded coverage initiations (n=184,200), reiterations (n=70,534), revisions issued on 
non-trading days (n=5,831), and observations with a missing analyst mask code 
(n=16,728) or missing CUSIP (n=319). These exclusions reduced sample size to 237,959. 
In order to avoid inferences based on inactive trading firms and “small stocks”, firms 
with a negative stock price or stocks with a price less than $5 are also removed.  
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To control for analysts herding behavior, I exclude all contrarian (trending) 
revisions issued on the same day or within the next week relative to the previous 
contrarian (trending) revisions on the same firm.1 As part of the robustness tests, I also 
tried to remove all the recommendations that are issued within a week before and after 
another revision, and the results remain unchanged. Another 26,241 observations are 
excluded because of missing data on earnings announcements. The final sample includes 
144,756 recommendation revisions.  
B. Define trending and contrarian recommendations 
Each recommended firm is categorized into 3 groups: outperform, underperform 
and undetermined. This classification is based on market-adjusted buy-and-hold excess 
returns during the week prior to the recommendation announcement day. Specifically, if 
the excess return from trading day -5 to -1 is above 3 percent, then that stock is defined as 
outperforming the market. If the excess return is below -3 percent, then it is defined as 
underperforming the market. The rest observations are classified as undetermined.  
I define trending revisions as recommendation changes that are consistent with 
past performance, i.e. analysts upgrade if the firm outperformed in the past week and 
downgrade if the firm underperformed. Likewise, contrarian revisions are defined as 
those inconsistent with past performance, i.e. analysts upgrade if the firm underperformed 
in the past week and downgrade if the firm outperformed. The rest of sample is classified 
as undetermined.2 
                                                            
1 For example, contrarian upgrades issued 3 days after another contrarian upgrade on the same firm are excluded. 
2 This 3 percent threshold is arbitrarily chosen. I also try 5 percent and 10 percent over different intervals in robustness 
tests, and the results show that the major findings remain qualitatively unchanged. 
12 
 
Table 1.1 reports firm specific characteristics (Panel A), and analyst 
characteristics (Panel B). The results show that an average firm in the sample has $8.9 
billion market value, $2.9 billion book value, a book to market ratio of 0.48 and is 
covered by 5.4 analysts. An average analyst has 7.5 years tenure since 1994 and covers 
6.2 firms per year. The mean recommendation level is 3.6, which implies analyst 
recommendation optimism, but the average revision is -0.08, so there are more 
downgrades than upgrades during the sample period. Overall, there are 8,827 analysts 
covering 8,744 firms, issuing 144,756 directional recommendation revisions (68,452 
upgrades and 76,304 downgrades). 
Table 1.2 reports descriptive statistics of directional revisions in groups across 
sample years. Trending recommendations (41,232 observations, 19,439 of which are 
upgrades and 21,793 are downgrades) constitute 28.48% of the whole sample. On the 
other hand, contrarian recommendations (39,565 observations, 18,556 of which are 
upgrades and 21,009 are downgrades) constitute 27.33% of the entire sample. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
A. The information role of contrarian revisions 
This section examines market reactions to different types of recommendation 
revisions. The market reaction is measured as the percentage buy-and-hold market-
adjusted stock return (raw return minus the return on the value-weighted index of all 
securities traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) over different time intervals around 
recommendation announcement dates. The return intervals reported are classified as one-
13 
 
day excess returns on day 0, (0, 2) three-day excess returns, (1, 2) two-day excess returns, 
(1, 5) five-day excess returns and (1, 1M) one-month excess returns. 
Table 1.3 reports the results. Since it is also possible that most of the day 0 returns 
have already been realized before the recommendation revision announcement, which 
makes the real profitability of trading on revisions much smaller than it appears 
(Altinkilic and Hansen (2009)), I focus on the short-term post recommendation 
announcement return starting one day after revision date, which should be realizable for 
any investor. Consistent with Womack (1996), in Table 1.3 Panel A I find significant 
post recommendation drifts after upgrades and downgrades.  
The new finding is clearly illustrated in Table 1.3 Panel B. Contrarian revisions 
have the largest short term drift, undetermined revisions lie in the middle and trending 
revisions have the smallest short term drift. This pattern is also reported in Figure 1. 
More importantly, Panel C reports the return differences among these three groups and all 
the differences are significant at 1% level. The results from Table 1.3 suggest that 1) all 
revisions experience post-recommendation drift and 2) contrarian recommendations 
appear more informative than trending recommendations, which is consistent with H1.  
It is well documented that small size stocks are associated with high trading costs. 
Bhushan (1994) finds that the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift is 
positively related to the direct and indirect costs of trading. Sadka (2006) also shows that 
momentum and post-earnings announcement drift anomalies can partially be explained 
by liquidity risk. Next, I examine the size effect on the post-recommendation 
announcement drift. Since firm sizes are highly correlated with trading costs and liquidity 
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risk, I sort all the firms into 10 size deciles based on the size breakpoints obtained from 
Kenneth French’s website.  
Table 1.4 shows the stock price reactions to analysts’ recommendation revisions 
for 10 size deciles subgroups within different time intervals around recommendation 
announcement dates. The results indicate that for undetermined and trending 
recommendations the magnitude of the return declines dramatically as firm size 
increases. For contrarian recommendations, the magnitude of the return does not drop 
much as firm size increases. For instance, for upgrade contrarian revisions, the 5-day drift 
is 1.07 percent for the smallest firms and 0.63 percent for the largest firms. This 0.44 
percent difference is not significant. However, the corresponding market-adjusted return 
for trending upgrade revisions is 1.08 percent and -0.48 percent, respectively. This 1.56 
percent difference is highly significant. 
Since these size portfolios are all sorted based on the same Fama French size 
decile breakpoints, there should be little size differences between contrarian and trending 
recommendations for the same size deciles. Therefore the results suggest investors are 
less responsive to contrarian revisions after controlling for firm’s size.  
Next I follow Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) to study the informativeness of both 
contrarian and trending revisions around the earnings announcement date (EAD). They 
use a (0, 2) three-day market adjusted excess return to proxy for the informativeness of 
revisions and found that for both upgrades and downgrades, the information content is at 
the lowest level in the week following earnings announcements and then increases 
thereafter as the time gets closer to the next earnings announcement. Their explanation is 
that the value of analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations stems more from their 
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independent collection of information than from their interpretation of public information 
(for example, quarterly earnings). More importantly, they documented a sharp increase in 
the information content of upgrades in the week before earnings announcements. In 
contrast they reported a decrease in the informativeness of downgrades in the week 
before earnings announcements. They argue that it is likely because analysts partly rely 
on guidance from insiders for forecast revisions during the pre-announcement period, and 
perhaps managers are more reluctant to provide bad news guidance to analysts. I confirm 
the findings of Ivkovic and Jagedeesh (2004) by showing a similar pattern in market 
adjusted announcement returns over the three day (0, 2) window relative to the earnings 
announcement date. Results are illustrated in Table 1.5.  
Because of the possible confounding effects of earnings announcements, I further 
divide the week before EAD into two parts: Day -5 to -3 before EAD and Day -2 to -1 
before EAD. For the revisions issued between Day -5 and -3 before EAD, the (0, 2) 3-day 
interval does not include the earnings announcement day, so the confounding effect is 
controlled for both trending and contrarian revisions. The (0, 2) 3-day returns of two 
subgroups are all highly significant and similar in magnitude, which implies the result is 
not driven by potentially confounded earnings announcements.  
We focus on recommendations fall in ‘Other date’ category, which are not 
confounded by the earnings and constitute the majority of recommendations. Consistent 
with the results presented thus far, we find that contrarian upgrades result in larger post-
recommendation drift than trending upgrades. This pattern clearly exists for all three drift 
windows presented. The results further confirm the prediction that contrarian 
recommendation revisions are more informative.  
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B. Multivariate regressions 
In this section, cross-sectional multivariate regressions are conducted to control 
for analyst and brokerage characteristics as well as firm-specific features. Muslu and Xue 
(2010) find that momentum recommendations are more likely to be issued by less 
talented and less experienced analysts, for small and growth companies, and during 
periods of high investor sentiment. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect contrarian 
revisions to behave oppositely. In order to be easily comparable with Muslu and Xue 
(2010)’s finding I use similar explanatory variables.  
I run the following OLS regression model on both the upward and downward 
revision sample. The dependent variables are the buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
percentage returns from different time intervals starting from the day after the 
recommendation announcement date. I consider the following: (1) Day one return, (1, 2) 
two-day return, (1, 5) five-day return (1, 1M) one-month return and (0, 2) three-day 
return. The regressions are performed for upgrades and downgrades separately. 
Contrarian is a dummy variable equal to one if the recommendation is released if the 
absolute value of the firm’s weekly stock price exceeds 3 percent and is inconsistent with 
the past return; Rec_Level is the recommendation level with higher values corresponding 
to more optimistic ratings; Firm_size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalization; BM is the book-to-market ratio as of the prior fiscal year end; Brk_size is 
the natural logarithm of the number of analysts at the brokerage firm during the year of 
the recommendation; Experienced is an indicator that is equal to one if analyst’s tenure 
since analyst’s first recommendation recorded in I/B/E/S relative to the current 
recommendation is longer than median tenure (7.26 years); No of firms is the number of 
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firms covered by that specific analyst during that year; No of analysts is the number of 
analysts covering the that specific firm during that year; All-star is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the analyst is an all-star analyst in the year of the recommendation based 
on Institutional Investor’s annual poll and; Before EAD is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the recommendation is released before an earnings announcement. SIC is the two-digit 
indicator of industries that is added to each regression to control for the corresponding 
industry fix effect. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
 
ܯܣܴ݅, ݐ  =  ߚ0 +  ߚ1(ܥ݋݊ݐݎܽݎ݅ܽ݊) +  ߚ2(ܴ݁ܿ_ܮ݁ݒ݈݁)  +  ߚ3(ܨ݅ݎ݉_ܵ݅ݖ݁)  +
 ߚ4(ܤܯ)  +  ߚ5(ܤݎ݇_ܵ݅ݖ݁) +  ߚ6(ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁݀) +  ߚ7(ܰ݋. ݋݂ ݂݅ݎ݉ݏ)  +
 ߚ8(ܰ݋. ݋݂ ݈ܽ݊ܽݕݏݐݏ)  +      ߚ9(ܧܲܵ_ܥℎ݃) +  ߚ10(ܣ݈݈ − ݏݐܽݎ) +
  ߚ11(ܤ݂݁݋ݎ݁ ܧܣܦ) +  ߚ12 (ܵܫܥ) +  ߝ, 
(1) 
Table 1.6 reports the OLS regression results for upgrades and downgrades 
samples separately. The coefficient of interest is that of Contrarian indicator. The 
upgrades/downgrades sample regression results indicate that the coefficients of the 
contrarian indicator are positive/negative and highly significant at the 1% level for all 
short term return regressions. The significance decreases as the return interval becomes 
longer. Everything else equal, the one week return after analyst contrarian upgrades is 
about 34 basis points higher than that of trending upgrades and one week return after 
contrarian downgrades is about 37 basis points lower than that of trending downgrades. 
This result is consistent with the previous univariate results reported in Table 1.3. 
Overall, the result confirms that contrarian revisions are more informative than trending 
revisions after controlling for known characteristics that are likely to influence the 
market’s response to analyst recommendations. 
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The coefficients of control variables are also in line with expectation. The positive 
coefficients in front of recommendation level (R_Level) during the short term period 
suggest that the higher the recommendation level, the more positive the market reacts. It 
is also indicated that the announcement drift is larger for smaller firms; the post 
announcement return is higher for firms with higher book-to-market ratio and the 
announcement drift after downgrades is larger firms covered by fewer analysts. As for the 
analysts’ characteristics, the results show that for analysts that are more experienced the 
announcement drift after upward revisions is larger.  
Overall, all the results indicate that the difference in the magnitude of the short-
term drifts after trending and contrarian revisions is both statistically and economically 
significant. The evidence collectively supports the notion that contrarian recommendation 
revisions are more informative.  
C. Determinants of contrarian recommendations 
In this section, I examine firm-level and analyst characteristics that are related to 
issuing contrarian recommendations. Because contrarian recommendations are 
considered bold, we follow a similar model as Clement and Tse (2005) who examine 
bold analyst forecasts. The prior expectation is that analysts who issue contrarian 
recommendations are expected to be more competent than those issuing trending 
recommendations. This notion is indirectly supported by Muslu and Xue (2010) who find 
that momentum recommendations are more likely to be issued by less talented and less 
experienced analysts. But the contrary argument can also be made since more 
experienced and all-star analysts are more likely to be affiliated with covered firms; 
therefore they are less likely to issue contrarian revisions.  
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I estimate a probit regression model on both upward and downward revision 
sample, with the dependent variable equal to one if the recommendation is considered a 
contrarian revision, zero otherwise. The results are reported in Table 1.7. The results 
show that analysts recognized as All-Stars and experienced analysts are less likely to 
issue contrarian downgrades, but analysts from smaller brokerage firms are more likely to 
issue contrarian revisions. This confirms the notion that these analysts are closely 
connected with covered firms, so they are less likely to issue contrarian 
recommendations. In the next section, I will investigate the possible profitability of 
trading on contrarian revisions. 
 
D. Trading costs 
Barber et al. (2001) find that after considering transaction costs, trading on 
aggregate analyst recommendations is not profitable. However, as they mentioned in their 
paper, this does not necessarily mean all trading strategies based on the analyst 
recommendations are always unprofitable. Keim and Madhavan (1998) provide an 
estimate of the total round-trip transactions costs incurred by institutions in trading 
stocks. The round-trip transaction costs can be as high as 4% on average for the smallest 
market cap quintile, but for the largest market cap quintile, the average round-trip 
transaction costs are only 0.57%. In this paper, I use the bid-ask spread to proxy for 
trading costs. 
Table 1.8 reports the results of short-term post recommendation drifts after 
considering the bid ask spread. In addition to the raw return, I also report the market 
adjusted return as well as the raw return. Table 1.8 reports the profit of trading on 
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recommendation revisions, so the profit for trading on downward revisions is actually the 
return from short selling. After considering the bid-ask spread, only the five-day holding 
periods after contrarian revisions remains significantly profitable while other types of 
recommendations all generate significantly negative profit. So it seems only contrarian 
revisions can generate enough short term return to cover the bid-ask spread. Even though 
the magnitude of drift itself drops significantly, the differences among those three types 
(trending, contrarian and undetermined) remain unchanged.  
 
E. Regulation FD 
Table 1.9 examines the changes in market reactions to recommendation revisions 
before and after the implementation of Reg FD. I examine 8-year window around Reg FD; 
October 1, 1996 to November 30, 2004. October 2000 splits the sample into two even 
sub-periods. Unlike Cornett et al. (2007) who examine only all-star analysts, I study non-
star analysts as well. Reg-FD is expected to most likely impact all-star analysts because 
they are the most likely to receive selected information from management (Bagnoli, 
Watts, and Zheng (2008)). Instead of focusing on the price reaction per se, I examine the 
difference in price reactions between all-star and non-star analysts between contrarian 
and trending revisions as well as before and after Reg FD.   
In Panel A of Table 1.9 we present the results for upgrades and downgrades 
before and after implementation of Reg FD. For upgrades, difference in the average 
market reaction to all-star and non-star analysts in the pre-Reg FD period is -0.21% 
compared to 0.10% in the post-Reg FD period. As expected, the difference between all-
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stars and non-stars significantly declines in the post-Reg FD period by 0.31%. I find 
similar results for downgrade recommendations. 
  In Panel B I separate sample into trending and contrarian recommendations. I 
focus on the difference between pre- and post-Reg FD, but also consider the difference 
between contrarian and trending revisions. For all-star upgrades in the pre-Reg FD period, 
the R(1, 2) return difference between contrarian and trending revisions is 0.64% 
compared to 0.01% for all-star upgrades in the post-Reg FD period. This difference of -
0.63% is significant at 5% level. The corresponding difference for non-star analysts is -
0.43% which is not significant. And I find similar results for downgrades. 
Thus, consistent with my last hypothesis, I find the gap between the market 
reaction from contrarian and trending revisions issued by all-star analysts significantly 
decreases after the Reg FD, so the information content of these contrarian revisions is 
diminished relative to trending revisions. 
 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, I investigate the robustness of my results. First, I examine the 
possible impact of outliers by winsorizing all variables at 2.5% and 97.5%. In unreported 
tables, the main findings remain the same, which implies the findings are not driven by 
outliers.  
Next, I set up different methodologies of defining outperformance/ 
underperformance as a robustness test for the arbitrary definition of outperformance/ 
underperformance I used in the previous sections. Originally, I defined outperformance 
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(underperformance) as outperforming (underperforming) the market return by 3% over a 
one-week period before the revision announcement day. In this section I try different 
combinations. 
A legitimate concern with our analysis is the impact of a large day -1 return. An 
example easily illustrates the possible concern: suppose during the week before an 
upward revision, the (-5, -2) four-day market adjusted return is -6%; however the daily 
market adjusted return on day -1 is 2%. Based on the definition it would be classified as 
contrarian upgrades since the (-5, -1) five-day market adjusted return is -4%, which is 
less than the threshold 3%. But it is also possible that the upward revision is issued based 
on the information came out on day -1, therefore it should be considered as a trending 
revision. To examine this problem, another classification criterion is constructed based on 
one day return on day -1, and the threshold is 1% and -1%.  
Table 1.10 reports stock price reactions (measured in %) to analysts’ 
recommendation revisions over (1, 2) and (1, 5) intervals. In panel A, contrarian upgrades 
and downgrades are further sorted based on the day -1 return. Interestingly, the results 
indicate that when the revision is inconsistent with day -1 return, the market reacts more 
significantly to both contrarian and trending revisions than when it is in line with day -1 
return. Therefore this finding further enhanced my hypothesis that contrarian revisions 
are more informative than trending revisions.  
In Panel B, I hold the measurement period for contrarian revisions constant at one 
week, but increase the threshold from 3 percent to 5 percent and 10 percent. As we 
increase the threshold the drift becomes larger in magnitude. In Panel C, I extend the 
23 
 
measurement period to one month from one week. Although no discernable increase in 
the magnitude of the drift as I increases threshold, drift is still observed in the direction of 
the revision and remains statistically and economically significant.  
Another concern with my finding is the clustering of analyst revisions may have a 
confounding impact on my results. For instance, suppose an analyst upgrades a stock on 
day 0 and another analyst upgrades the same stock on day +2. In this case, it is likely that 
the second analyst caused a market reaction upon the upgrade, but I attribute that to post-
recommendation drift to the first analyst. To deal with this potential concern, I eliminate 
all observations where there is one revision of the same type issued within a week, days 
(-5, +5) and find similar results. For the sake of brevity, I do not tabulate them. 
Overall, my findings are robust to the different criteria of defining 
contrarian/trending revisions and they are not driven by outliers or analysts’ herding 
effects. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
To better understand the information role of analyst revisions, this paper studies a 
special group of revisions: revisions issued right after stock price has experienced 
sizeable changes. 
I show that if the recommendation announcement day is excluded, the market 
responds more strongly to analysts’ revisions (both upgrade and downgrade) when these 
recommendation changes are inconsistent with past returns of the stock (contrarian 
revisions). This result holds different time intervals starting one day after earnings 
announcement.  
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This finding directly contradicts with Altinkilic and Hansen (2009)’s conclusion 
that analyst recommendations are information free. I find the short term drift, which starts 
one day after the announcement, is both statistically and economically significant. All the 
evidence conclusively indicates the contrarian recommendations are more informative 
than trending revisions. The bid-ask spread cannot subsume the trading profitability of 
contrarian revisions.  
Surprisingly, I find that they are less likely to issue contrarian downgrades but 
analysts from small brokerage firms are more likely to issue them. One possible 
explanation for this unexpected result could be that the affiliation with covered firms 
makes all-stars more reluctant to issue a downgrade on a client firm, particularly if it goes 
against market trends.  
Last but not least, I examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure's (Reg FD) 
on the information content of contrarian revisions. I use the difference in difference 
analysis to examine the pre- and post-FD changes in the difference between contrarian 
and trending recommendations issued by all-star analysts. I find that the difference 
declines significantly after the Reg FD, indicating that the private information contained 
in contrarian recommendations has declined relative to trending recommendations.  
Taken as a whole, all the results lead to the conclusion that analyst 
recommendations contain important information, suggesting sell side analysts are 
important information agents despite recent evidence challenging this view. 
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Table 1.1 Summary statistics*  
Panel A Firm characteristics N MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX STD 
Stock Price ($ per share) 144,737 33.439 27.950 5.010 916.500 26.410 
Market Cap ($1,000,000) 144,756 8,931.326 1,999.855 6.942 581,147.816 24,929.834 
Book to Market Ratio 137,558 0.475 0.368 -8.707 126.003 0.781 
Book Value ($1,000,000) 137,558 2,907.797 726.189 -25,560.000 142,394.000 7,946.268 
Number of Shares (1,000 shares) 144,756 241,707.000 74,150.000 651.000 11,144,681.000 641,513.000 
Positive Earnings 144,756 0.867 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.340 
Past 6-month return 140,878 0.068 0.031 -0.948 20.793 0.429 
Number of Analysts Per Firm 144,756 5.376 5.000 1.000 23.000 3.186 
     
 
 Panel B Analyst characteristics 
Analyst Tenure since 1994 144,756 7.499 7.260 0.000 15.836 4.166 
Number of Firms Per Analyst 144,756 6.214 5.000 1.000 98.000 6.328 
Recommendation Level 144,756 3.618 4.000 1.000 5.000 1.008 
Revision Magnitude 144,756 -0.079 -1.000 -4.000 4.000 1.476 
Brokerage Size 144,756 37.153 30.000 1.000 138.000 29.183 
 
*This table provides summary statistics on the sample of 144,756 directional recommendation revisions (either upgrade or 
downgrade) from January 1994 to December 2009. Panel A reports firm specific characteristics, whereas Panel B reports analyst 
characteristics. Analyst data are from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. Daily stock price data during the 
same period are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Firm specific financial information is obtained from 
Compustat.  
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Table 1.2 Distributions of analysts’ revisions across years* 
Year 
Total 
revisions 
Trending Contrarian Undetermined 
Upgrades Downgrades Upgrades Downgrades Upgrades Downgrades 
1994 3,771 523 503 399 390 1,036 920 
 
  13.87% 13.34% 10.58% 10.34% 27.47% 24.40% 
1995 6,881 770 1,045 681 787 1,649 1,949 
 
  11.19% 15.19% 9.90% 11.44% 23.96% 28.32% 
1996 6,710 902 976 809 802 1,693 1,528 
 
  13.44% 14.55% 12.06% 11.95% 25.23% 22.77% 
1997 6,658 963 1,127 756 825 1,420 1,567 
 
  14.46% 16.93% 11.35% 12.39% 21.33% 23.54% 
1998 8,206 1,233 1,772 1,109 1,097 1,437 1,558 
 
  15.03% 21.59% 13.51% 13.37% 17.51% 18.99% 
1999 8,364 1,555 1,438 1,400 1,199 1,524 1,248 
 
  18.59% 17.19% 16.74% 14.34% 18.22% 14.92% 
2000 7,825 1,367 1,641 1,199 1,332 1,030 1,256 
 
  17.47% 20.97% 15.32% 17.02% 13.16% 16.05% 
2001 8,444 1,307 1,707 1,162 1,440 1,234 1,594 
 
  15.48% 20.22% 13.76% 17.05% 14.61% 18.88% 
2002 11,711 1,385 2,150 1,338 2,033 1,844 2,961 
 
  11.83% 18.36% 11.43% 17.36% 15.75% 25.28% 
2003 11,110 1,410 1,309 1,143 1,669 2,511 3,068 
 
  12.69% 11.78% 10.29% 15.02% 22.60% 27.61% 
2004 10,569 1,171 1,235 1,187 1,305 2,719 2,952 
 
  11.08% 11.69% 11.23% 12.35% 25.73% 27.93% 
2005 10,295 1,154 1,022 1,215 1,308 2,853 2,743 
 
  11.21% 9.93% 11.80% 12.71% 27.71% 26.64% 
2006 10,797 1,176 1,241 1,263 1,387 2,612 3,118 
 
  10.89% 11.49% 11.70% 12.85% 24.19% 28.88% 
2007 11,164 1,205 1,289 1,522 1,459 2,893 2,796 
 
  10.79% 11.55% 13.63% 13.07% 25.91% 25.04% 
2008 12,290 1,734 2,044 2,131 2,123 2,074 2,184 
 
  14.11% 16.63% 17.34% 17.27% 16.88% 17.77% 
2009 9,961 1,584 1,294 1,242 1,853 1,928 2,060 
 
  15.90% 12.99% 12.47% 18.60% 19.36% 20.68% 
Average 9,047.25 1,214.94 1,362.06 1,159.75 1,313.06 1,903.56 2,093.88 
Total 144,756 19,439 21,793 18,556 21,009 30,457 33,502 
  
41,232 39,565 63,959 
Pct of all 
 
28.48% 27.33% 44.18% 
 
*This table reports the number and corresponding percentage of trending/contrarian/ 
undetermined revision groups during 1994 - 2009. For each calendar year, 
recommendations that represent a directional revision (either upgrade or downgrade) for 
a specific analyst and company are categorized into three groups (contrarian/ 
trending/undetermined) based on the market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns during the 
week prior to the recommendation date. 
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Table 1.3 Buy-and-hold mean abnormal returns around analysts’ revisions* 
 
Panel A. Mean Return Grouped by Revision direction No. of Obs R(0) R(0, 2) R(1, 2) R(1, 5) R(1, 1M) 
Upgrade  
 
68,452 2.04*** 2.43*** 0.39*** 0.58*** 0.94*** 
Downgrade 
 
76,304 -2.38*** -2.76*** -0.39*** -0.58*** -0.87*** 
        Panel B. Mean Return Grouped by Revision direction plus Trending/Undetermined/Contrarian sub-groups 
Upgrade 
  
  
Trending 19,439 2.03*** 2.31*** 0.27*** 0.43*** 0.97*** 
Undetermined  30,457 1.78*** 2.14*** 0.34*** 0.52*** 0.82*** 
Contrarian 18,556 2.45*** 3.04*** 0.57*** 0.84*** 1.11*** 
Downgrade 
  
  
Trending 21,793 -2.99*** -3.25*** -0.23*** -0.48*** -0.78*** 
Undetermined  33,502 -2.00*** -2.37*** -0.38*** -0.50*** -0.71*** 
Contrarian 21,009 -2.34*** -2.87*** -0.55*** -0.82*** -1.20*** 
        Panel C. Difference in Mean Return 
Contrarian-Trending Upgrade 
 
0.42*** 0.73*** 0.30*** 0.41*** 0.14 
Downgrade 
 
0.65*** 0.38*** -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.42*** 
Contrarian-Undetermined Upgrade 
 
0.67*** 0.90*** 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.29** 
Downgrade 
 
-0.34*** -0.50*** -0.17*** -0.32*** -0.49*** 
*The buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return (raw return minus the return on the value-weighted index of all securities traded on 
the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) are calculated for each revision groups in our sample. The return intervals reported below are one-
day excess returns on day 0 , three-day excess returns on (0, 2), two-day excess returns on (1, 2), five-day excess returns on (1, 5) and 
one-month excess return on (1, 1M). Trending recommendations are defined as revisions that are consistent with past excess returns, 
whereas contrarian recommendation revisions are defined as revisions that are inconsistent with past excess returns. The remaining 
revisions are classified as Undetermined. See the text for a detailed explanation. Panel A reports upgrades and downgrades. In Panel 
B, within each recommendation upgrade and downgrade group, we present the mean abnormal return for contrarian, trending and 
undetermined revisions. Panel C reports the difference in mean return, which tests the difference in market returns between contrarian 
revisions and the other two types of revisions. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2009. *** and ** denote 
significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 1.4 Buy-and-hold mean abnormal returns for different size deciles* 
 
  Upward Revisions  Downward Revisions 
Size Deciles N R(0) R(1, 5) R(1, 1M)  N R(0) R(1,5) R(1, 1M) 
Trending 
1 632 3.10*** 1.08*** 2.16***  1061 -3.58*** -1.05*** -1.81*** 
2 1527 2.97*** 0.62*** 1.84***  2193 -4.17*** -0.81*** -0.93*** 
3 1712 2.77*** 0.86*** 1.91***  2346 -4.10*** -0.50*** -1.01*** 
4 1838 2.59*** 0.77*** 1.57***  2338 -3.36*** -0.65*** -0.69** 
5 2014 2.27*** 0.59*** 1.47***  2300 -3.00*** -0.62*** -0.42 
6 1961 1.75*** 0.45** 1.04***  2115 -2.63*** -0.49*** -0.56 
7 1961 1.68*** 0.41** 0.54  2184 -2.50*** -0.32 -1.11*** 
8 2448 1.55*** 0.22 0.50  2387 -2.07*** -0.16 -0.05 
9 2565 1.17*** 0.14 -0.03  2269 -2.04*** -0.09 -0.75** 
10 2781 0.99*** -0.48*** -0.58**  2600 -1.44*** 0.12 -0.22 
 
1-10  2.11*** 1.56*** 2.75***   -2.14*** -1.17*** -1.59*** 
Undetermined 
1 803 2.85*** 0.95*** 1.44***  841 -2.90*** -0.98*** -1.32*** 
2 1821 2.83*** 0.98*** 1.77***  2203 -3.33*** -0.63*** -1.06*** 
3 2069 2.42*** 0.95*** 1.56***  2307 -2.88*** -0.79*** -0.89*** 
4 2428 2.46*** 0.84*** 1.48***  2704 -2.67*** -0.63*** -0.64*** 
5 2513 2.06*** 0.58*** 0.80***  2986 -2.33*** -0.56*** -0.78*** 
6 2914 1.76*** 0.49*** 0.75***  3224 -1.92*** -0.50*** -0.80*** 
7 3262 1.86*** 0.35*** 0.59***  3539 -1.64*** -0.30*** -0.30 
8 3841 1.43*** 0.34*** 0.59***  4376 -1.51*** -0.24*** -0.41*** 
9 4695 1.15*** 0.24*** 0.43***  4914 -1.27*** -0.34*** -0.50*** 
10 6111 0.80*** 0.19*** 0.07  6408 -1.03*** -0.37*** -0.72*** 
 1-10  2.05*** 0.76*** 1.37***   -1.87*** -0.61*** -0.60** 
Contrarian 
1 861 3.62*** 1.07*** 1.62***  685 -2.98*** -1.04*** -2.00*** 
2 1816 3.44*** 1.01*** 1.98***  1895 -3.26*** -1.02*** -1.51*** 
3 1920 3.10*** 1.18*** 1.31***  2011 -2.77*** -0.96*** -1.31*** 
4 1927 2.57*** 0.65*** 1.22***  2195 -2.73*** -0.88*** -1.28*** 
5 1909 2.37*** 0.91*** 1.23***  2210 -2.44*** -0.99*** -1.69*** 
6 1726 2.38*** 0.78*** 1.14***  2105 -2.03*** -0.66*** -0.55 
7 1875 2.02*** 0.81*** 0.44  2243 -2.05*** -0.55*** -0.84*** 
8 1998 1.99*** 0.68*** 1.05***  2463 -1.83*** -0.43*** -0.25 
9 2190 1.60*** 0.57*** 0.70**  2527 -1.74*** -0.82*** -1.51*** 
10 2334 1.19*** 0.63*** 0.18  2675 -1.40*** -0.75*** -1.12*** 
 1-10  2.43*** 0.44 1.44***   -1.58*** -0.29 -0.88** 
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
*This table presents buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (raw return minus the return on the value-weighted index of all 
securities traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) around analysts’ recommendation revisions. Within each recommendation 
upgrade and downgrade groups, the results are reported for 10 size deciles around recommendation revisions. The 10 size deciles are 
sorted based on the size decile breakpoints from Kenneth French’s website. The buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns are 
calculated for each revision group in our sample. The return intervals reported below are one-day excess returns on day 0, five-day 
excess returns on (1, 5) and one-month excess return on (1, 1M). Trending recommendations are defined as revisions that are 
consistent with past excess returns, whereas contrarian recommendation revisions are defined as revisions that are inconsistent with 
past excess returns. The remaining revisions are classified as Undetermined. See the text for a detailed explanation.  The sample 
period is from January 1994 to December 2009. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 1.5 Stock price response to recommendation revisions with different timing with respect to earnings announcements* 
Panel A. Upward revisions   N R(0) R(0, 2) R(1, 2) R(1, 5) R(1, 1M) 
Trending 
EAD and the day after 3526 3.25*** 3.61*** 0.34*** 0.59*** 1.64*** 
Day 2 to 5 after EAD 2073 1.10*** 1.35*** 0.24*** 0.51*** 1.16*** 
 Other date 12742 1.92*** 2.16*** 0.23*** 0.33*** 0.73*** 
Day -5 to -3 before EAD 635 1.86*** 2.27*** 0.39** 0.86*** 0.99 
Day -2 to -1 before EAD 461 1.82*** 1.94*** 0.15 0.2 0.41 
Undetermined 
EAD and the day after 4945 3.41*** 4.12*** 0.69*** 0.97*** 1.42*** 
Day 2 to 5 after EAD 1852 0.99*** 1.16*** 0.16 0.27** 0.37 
 Other date 21702 1.61*** 1.92*** 0.31*** 0.43*** 0.72*** 
Day -5 to -3 before EAD 1102 1.53*** 2.10*** 0.56*** 0.79*** 0.61 
Day -2 to -1 before EAD 853 1.71*** 2.44*** 0.72*** 1.10*** 0.94** 
Contrarian 
EAD and the day after 2750 4.40*** 5.02*** 0.58*** 0.81*** 1.08*** 
Day 2 to 5 after EAD 1732 1.49*** 1.75*** 0.25** 0.26 0.46 
 Other date 12971 2.17*** 2.73*** 0.55*** 0.77*** 1.12*** 
Day -5 to -3 before EAD 628 2.86*** 3.61*** 0.72*** 1.43*** 1.50** 
Day -2 to -1 before EAD 474 2.73*** 3.99*** 1.22*** 1.60*** 1.60** 
Panel B. Downward revisions    N R(0) R(0, 2) R(1, 2) R(1, 5) R(1, 1M) 
Trending 
EAD and the day after 3565 -5.24*** -5.61*** -0.33*** -0.33** -0.74*** 
Day 2 to 5 after EAD 2002 -0.98*** -1.02*** -0.02 -0.09 -0.19 
 Other date 14990 -2.89*** -3.09*** -0.18*** -0.48*** -0.58*** 
Day -5 to -3 before EAD 752 -2.55*** -2.08*** 0.52** 0.63 0.69 
Day -2 to -1 before EAD 480 -1.33*** -0.93** 0.4 0.57 0.6 
Undetermined 
EAD and the day after 5303 -4.54*** -5.11*** -0.61*** -0.60*** -0.22 
Day 2 to 5 after EAD 1785 -0.74*** -0.97*** -0.23*** -0.28** -0.31 
 Other date 24347 -1.77*** -2.12*** -0.37*** -0.48*** -0.80*** 
Day -5 to -3 before EAD 1206 -1.66*** -1.98*** -0.38*** -0.16 -0.33 
Day -2 to -1 before EAD 860 -1.27*** -1.30*** -0.06 -0.23 0.23 
Contrarian 
EAD and the day after 3141 -4.88*** -5.61*** -0.78*** -0.79*** -0.34 
Day 2 to 5 after EAD 1786 -1.16*** -1.53*** -0.36*** -0.43*** -0.80*** 
 Other date 14820 -2.12*** -2.63*** -0.52*** -0.87*** -1.22*** 
Day -5 to -3 before EAD 722 -1.75*** -2.01*** -0.27 0.19 -0.04 
Day -2 to -1 before EAD 540 -2.12*** -2.52*** -0.4 -0.07 0.17 
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Table 1.5 (Continued) 
*Table 1.5 presents stock price reactions to analysts’ revisions of stock recommendations around the earnings announcement date. The 
stock price reaction is measured as the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return (raw return minus the return on the value-weighted 
index of all securities traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) around analysts’ recommendation revisions. The return intervals 
reported below are one-day excess returns on day 0 , three-day excess returns on (0, 2), two-day excess returns on (1, 2), five-day 
excess returns on (1, 5) and one-month excess return on (1, 1M). Trending recommendations are defined as revisions that are 
consistent with past excess returns, whereas contrarian recommendation revisions are defined as revisions that are inconsistent with 
past excess returns. The remaining revisions are classified as Undetermined. See the text for a detailed explanation. Revisions are 
categorized into 5 groups based on the number of trading days relative to the earnings announcement date. EAD and the day after 
refers to the group of revisions that are issued on the earnings announcement day and the next trading day; Day 2 to 5 after EAD refers 
to the group of revisions that issued one week after the earnings announcement day except the day after EAD;  Day -5 to -3 before 
EAD refers to the group of revisions that issued between 5 trading days before and 3 trading days before the earnings announcement 
day;  Day -2 to -1 before EAD refers to the group of revisions that issued within 2 days before the earnings announcement day. Panels 
A and B present the results for upward and downward revisions separately. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 
2009. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
35 
 
Table 1.6 OLS regressions* 
*Table 1.6 displays the OLS regression results for the post-recommendation revision drift 
of contrarian recommendations. The regressions are performed for upgrades (Panel A) 
and downgrades (Panel B), separately. The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted returns. The return intervals reported below are one-day excess returns 
on day 0 , two-day excess returns on (1, 2), five-day excess returns on (1, 5) and one-
month excess return on (1, 1M). The key explanatory variable is Contrarian dummy, 
which equals 1 for contrarian revisions and 0 for trending revisions. See the text for the 
definition of all other variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis under corresponding 
coefficients. We control for fixed effects at the industry level using 2-digit SIC codes. 
 Upgrades  Downgrades 
R(1) R(1, 2) R(1, 5) R(1, 1M) R(0, 2) R(1) R(1, 2) R(1, 5) R(1, 1M) R(0, 2) 
Intercept -0.794 -0.446 -0.889 -3.400 -0.166 -0.317 -0.899 -1.329 -2.645 -5.256 
(0.596) (0.826) (0.719) (0.412) (0.938) (0.370) (0.025) (0.082) (0.044) (0.000) 
Contrarian 0.196 0.248 0.337 0.153 0.599 -0.188 -0.241 -0.366 -0.393 -0.108 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.332) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.120) 
Rec_Level 0.121 0.161 0.221 0.409 0.292 0.108 0.143 0.118 0.158 0.663 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.029) (0.000) 
Firm_Size -0.054 -0.072 -0.117 -0.310 -0.425 0.019 0.022 0.010 -0.114 0.361 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.421) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.099 0.154 0.233 0.496 0.398 0.047 0.070 0.088 0.422 0.205 
(0.084) (0.034) (0.030) (0.038) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.109) (0.007) (0.001) 
Brk_Size 0.030 0.027 0.053 0.158 0.642 0.015 0.016 -0.010 0.052 -0.650 
(0.137) (0.321) (0.204) (0.058) (0.000) (0.265) (0.386) (0.727) (0.314) (0.000) 
Experienced 0.145 0.151 0.303 0.504 0.278 -0.025 0.002 0.073 0.113 -0.201 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.366) (0.965) (0.191) (0.282) (0.002) 
No. of firms 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013 
(0.925) (0.820) (0.979) (0.981) (0.245) (0.369) (0.632) (0.821) (0.480) (0.003) 
No of analysts 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.047 0.022 0.015 0.027 0.058 0.166 0.035 
(0.872) (0.648) (0.591) (0.115) (0.147) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
EPS_Chg 0.034 -0.025 -0.066 -0.082 -0.134 0.077 0.011 0.024 0.048 0.189 
(0.632) (0.803) (0.559) (0.664) (0.317) (0.228) (0.891) (0.784) (0.762) (0.046) 
All_Star -0.057 0.044 0.146 0.766 0.230 -0.001 0.037 0.049 0.045 -0.265 
(0.324) (0.578) (0.214) (0.001) (0.061) (0.988) (0.500) (0.548) (0.774) (0.005) 
Before EAD 0.218 0.298 0.521 0.352 0.935 -0.090 0.003 0.215 0.374 -0.351 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.003) (0.215) (0.000) (0.137) (0.972) (0.079) (0.051) (0.007) 
N  33,908 33,911 33,910 33,899 33,914  38,004 38,007 38,005 37,997 38,010 
R2 0.56% 0.57% 0.58% 0.69% 3.58%  0.33% 0.30% 0.29% 0.43% 3.48% 
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Table 1.7 Probit regressions* 
 
Upgrades Downgrades 
Intercept -0.415 -0.442 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Rec_Level 0.022 0.019 
(0.004) (0.007) 
Firm_Size -0.060 -0.033 
(0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.042 -0.093 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Brk_Size -0.010 -0.009 
(0.078) (0.067) 
Experienced -0.012 -0.028 
(0.268) (0.007) 
No. of firms 0.000 0.002 
(0.843) (0.048) 
No of analysts 0.020 0.014 
(0.000) (0.000) 
EPS_Chg -0.031 0.008 
 
(0.012) (0.495) 
All_Star 0.003 -0.037 
(0.875) (0.027) 
BEF_EAD -0.036 -0.035 
(0.066) (0.057) 
N 61,426 68,356 
Pseudo R2 1.35% 0.49% 
 
*Table 1.7 presents probit regression. The dependent variable is a binary variable which 
equals to one if revision is classified as Contrarian revision, zero otherwise. Regressions 
are performed for upgrades and downgrades, separately. See the text for a complete 
description of independent variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis under 
corresponding coefficients.  
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Table 1.8 Trading profitability after considering the bid ask spread* 
Panel A. Mean Return Grouped by Revision direction 
 
No. of Obs (1,2) (1,5) 
Upgrade  
 
68,452 -0.27*** 0.00 
Downgrade 
 
76,304 -0.39*** -0.20*** 
     Panel A. Mean Return Grouped by Revision direction plus Trending/Undetermined/Contrarian sub-groups 
Upgrade 
  
  
Trending 19,439 -0.47*** -0.21*** 
Undetermined  30,457 -0.23*** 0.03 
Contrarian 18,556 -0.12*** 0.18*** 
Downgrade 
  
  
Trending 21,793 -0.78*** -0.57*** 
Undetermined  33,502 -0.30*** -0.19*** 
Contrarian 21,009 -0.14*** 0.16*** 
 
    Panel C. Difference in Mean Return  
Contrarian-Trending Upgrade 
 
0.35*** 0.39*** 
Downgrade 
 
0.64*** 0.73*** 
Contrarian-Undetermined Upgrade 
 
0.11** 0.15** 
Downgrade 
 
0.16*** 0.35*** 
 
*Table 1.8 is a replication of Table 1.3 by substituting bid/ask price for mean daily price. 
The buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return (raw return minus the return on the value-
weighted index of all securities traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) are calculated 
for each revision groups in our sample. The return intervals reported below are one-day 
excess returns on day 0 , three-day excess returns on (0, 2), two-day excess returns on (1, 
2), five-day excess returns on (1, 5) and one-month excess return on (1, 1M). Trending 
recommendations are defined as revisions that are consistent with past excess returns, 
whereas contrarian recommendation revisions are defined as revisions that are 
inconsistent with past excess returns. The remaining revisions are classified as 
Undetermined. See the text for a detailed explanation. Panel A reports upgrades and 
downgrades. In Panel B, within each recommendation upgrade and downgrade group, we 
present the mean abnormal return for contrarian, trending and undetermined revisions. 
Panel C reports the difference in mean return, which tests the difference in market returns 
between contrarian revisions and the other two types of revisions. The sample period is 
from January 1994 to December 2009. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.9 Difference in the market reaction to analysts’ recommendation revisions 
before and after Reg FD * 
 
 
Panel A. Mean Return Grouped by Revision direction and All-Star indicator 
   
No. of Obs (0, 2) (0) (1,2) 
Upgrades Pre_Reg FD Non-star 17384 1.85*** 1.54*** 0.29*** 
  
All_star 2740 2.96*** 2.47*** 0.50*** 
  
Diff 
 
-1.11*** -0.93*** -0.21** 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 19534 2.67*** 2.04*** 0.61*** 
  
All_star 2472 3.38*** 2.85*** 0.51*** 
  
Diff 
 
-0.71*** -0.81*** 0.10 
 
Post Diff-Pre Diff 
  
0.40* 0.12 0.31** 
       Downgrades Pre_Reg FD Non-star 19688 -2.66*** -2.18*** -0.46*** 
  
All_star 2827 -3.93*** -3.45*** -0.50*** 
  
Diff 
 
1.27*** 1.27*** 0.04 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 25439 -2.66*** -2.32*** -0.36*** 
  
All_star 3387 -3.24*** -3.03*** -0.22*** 
  
Diff 
 
0.58*** 0.71*** -0.14 
 
Post Diff-Pre Diff 
  
-0.69*** -0.56*** -0.18 
 
Panel B. Mean Return Grouped by All-Star indicator plus Trending/Undetermined/Contrarian 
sub-groups 
 
Upgrades   No. of Obs (0,2) (0) (1,2) 
Trending Pre_Reg FD Non-star 5819 1.79*** 1.72*** 0.07 
  
All_star 898 2.86*** 2.54*** 0.33** 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 5715 2.81*** 2.15*** 0.64*** 
  
All_star 740 3.34*** 2.88*** 0.45*** 
Contrarian Pre_Reg FD Non-star 5165 2.41*** 1.86*** 0.54*** 
  
All_star 810 3.87*** 2.90*** 0.97*** 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 5183 3.05*** 2.34*** 0.68*** 
  
All_star 596 3.76*** 3.26*** 0.46** 
Contrarian-Trending Pre_Reg FD Non-star 
 
0.62*** 0.14 0.47*** 
  
All_star 
 
1.01*** 0.36 0.64** 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 
 
0.24 0.19 0.04 
  
All_star 
 
0.42 0.38 0.01 
Post Diff-Pre Diff Non-star 
 
-0.38 0.05 -0.43 
  
All_star 
 
-0.59 0.02 -0.63** 
Downgrades 
      Trending Pre_Reg FD Non-star 4780 -3.29*** -2.95*** -0.28*** 
  
All_star 800 -4.35*** -4.13*** -0.22 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 5716 -3.27*** -3.03*** -0.24*** 
  
All_star 830 -4.02*** -3.77*** -0.23 
Contrarian Pre_Reg FD Non-star 3533 -2.61*** -1.92*** -0.69*** 
  
All_star 617 -3.50*** -2.87*** -0.65*** 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 5694 -2.68*** -2.22*** -0.48*** 
  
All_star 766 -3.36*** -3.15*** -0.21 
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Table 1.9 (Continued) 
 
Contrarian-Trending Pre_Reg FD Non-star 
 
0.68*** 1.03*** -0.41*** 
  
All_star 
 
0.85* 1.26*** -0.43* 
 
Post_Reg FD Non-star 
 
0.59*** 0.81*** -0.24** 
  
All_star 
 
0.66 0.62 0.02 
Post Diff-Pre Diff Non-star 
 
-0.09 -0.22 0.17 
  
All_star 
 
-0.19 -0.64 0.45* 
*In Table 1.9, we restrict our sample to recommendations issued between October 1, 
1996 and November 30, 2004. This sample is further split into two periods: the pre-FD 
period from October 1, 1996 to September 30, 2000 and the post-FD period from 
November 1, 2000 to November 30, 2004. The buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock 
return (raw return minus the return on the value-weighted index of all securities traded on 
the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) are calculated for each revision groups in our sample. 
The return intervals reported below are three-day excess returns on (0, 2), one-day excess 
returns on day 0 and two-day excess returns on (1, 2). Trending recommendations are 
defined as revisions that are consistent with past excess returns, whereas contrarian 
recommendation revisions are defined as revisions that are inconsistent with past excess 
returns. The remaining revisions are classified as Undetermined. See the text for a 
detailed explanation. Panel A reports pre- vs post Reg FD mean returns grouped by 
revision direction (upward vs. downward). In Panel B, within each recommendation 
upgrade and downgrade group, we present the mean abnormal return for contrarian, 
trending and undetermined revisions. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
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Table 1.10 Robustness test for different definitions of trending/contrarian* 
 
Panel A. Contrarian revisions classified based on day -1 one-day return 
  (1, 2) market-adjusted return  (1, 5) market-adjusted return 
 R(-1)<-1% -1%<R(-1) 
<1% 
1%<R(-1) R(-1)<-1% -1%<R(-1) 
<1% 
1%<R(-1) 
1wk 3% 
contrarian 
upgrades  
0.70*** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.99*** 0.72*** 0.47*** 
12639 5450 3725 12639 5450 3725 
1wk 3% 
contrarian 
downgrades  
-0.44*** -0.46*** -0.62*** -0.76*** -0.67*** -0.90*** 
4212 6753 14569 4212 6753 14569 
       
Panel B. Contrarian revisions classified based on pre-announcement one-week return 
 3% threshold 5% threshold 10% 
threshold 
3% threshold 5% threshold 10% 
threshold 
Contrarian 
Upgrades 
0.57*** 0.64*** 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.95*** 1.18*** 
18556 14459 5841 21814 14459 5841 
Contrarian 
Downgrades 
-0.55*** -0.61*** -0.68*** -0.82*** -0.89*** -0.96*** 
21009 17335 7566 25534 17335 7566 
       
Panel C. Contrarian revisions classified based on pre-announcement one-month return 
 3% threshold 5% threshold 10% 
threshold 
3% threshold 5% threshold 10% 
threshold 
Contrarian 
Upgrades 
0.46*** 0.47*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.65*** 0.73*** 
32085 26224 15211 32085 26224 15211 
Contrarian 
Downgrades 
-0.45*** -0.45*** -0.49*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.68*** 
36891 30735 19005 36891 30735 19005 
 
*The buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return (raw return minus the return on the 
value-weighted index of all securities traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) are 
calculated for each revision group in our sample. The return intervals reported below are 
two-day excess returns on (1, 2) and five-day excess returns on (1, 5). Contrarian 
recommendation revisions are defined as revisions that are inconsistent with past excess 
returns. See the text for a detailed explanation. The revisions reported in Panel A are 
contrarian upward and contrarian downward revisions defined based on the one week 
pre-announcement return and a 3% threshold. Panel B reports the mean abnormal return 
for the groups of contrarian revisions based on whether the magnitude of the pre-
announcement one week market-adjusted return is larger than 3%, 5% and 10% 
threshold. Panel C reports the mean abnormal return on (1, 2) for the groups of contrarian 
revisions based on whether the magnitude of pre-announcement one month market-
adjusted return is larger than 3%, 5% and 10% thresholds.  The sample period is from 
January 1994 to December 2009. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, 
respectively. 
  
41 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Post upward revisions short-term buy-and-hold mean abnormal returns 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Post downward revisions short-term buy-and-hold mean abnormal returns 
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MARKET REACTION TO EARNINGS WHEN INVESTORS DISAGREE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well documented in the finance literature that institutional investors play a 
significant role in setting the market equilibrium price; however, the role of individual 
investors is usually neglected. For example, in the Daniel et al. (1998) classic model, it is 
assumed individual investors have no influence on setting the equilibrium price because 
institutional investors dominate price-setting. Many studies have questioned this strong 
assumption and argue that individual investors are also expected to have an impact on the 
market equilibrium price setting. This paper specifically addresses how the divergence of 
opinions between individual and institutional investors affects stock price movements at 
the time of earnings announcements. I find that the divergence of investors’ opinions has 
a significant impact on stock price movements around earnings announcements. 
Specifically, the divergence of opinion has a negative relation with the immediate market 
reaction but a positive relation with the subsequent stock price drift. 
This paper also studies the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD), which is 
the tendency for a stock price to move in the same direction as an earnings surprise for 
weeks or even months after the announcement. In the past several decades, post-earnings-
announcement drift has remained an elusive puzzle since its discovery by Ball and Brown 
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(1968). It is generally regarded as a sharp challenge to market efficiency (e.g., Bernard 
and Thomas (1989), (1990); Bernard et al. (1997); Fama (1998); Mendenhall (2004) etc.).  
Despite the extensive literature on PEAD, there is no consensus to date regarding 
the sources of the drift. Some researchers argue that investors’ underreaction to earnings 
news could be driven by their rational perception of incremental firm risk or misspecified 
asset pricing models (e.g., Ball(1992); Sadka (2006); Konchitchki et al. (2010); Garfinkel 
and Sokobin (2006) etc.). Others indicate that PEAD is driven by investors’ 
underreaction to earnings news, a view initially proposed by Ball and Brown (1968) and 
later supported by many studies (Bernard and Thomas (1989), Bernard, Thomas and 
Wahlen (1997), etc.). Particularly, investor irrationality can influence the price in the 
short run, and PEAD can be attributed to an underreaction to earnings surprises due to 
psychological biases such as overconfidence and conservatism (e.g., DeLong et al. 
(1991), Kandel and Pearson (1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Daniel et al. (1998), 
Fischer and Verrecchia (1999), Lee (2001), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), etc.). This 
debate is not limited to theory. Empirical studies also find mixed evidence about whether 
PEAD reflects a rational risk premium or an irrational underreaction to earnings news 
(see Lakonishok et al. (1994); Bernard et al. (1997); Dechow and Sloan (1997); Lee and 
Swaminathan(2000); Daniel and Titman (2006), etc.). 
A key element found in several of the theories that explain investors’ 
underreaction is divergence among investors’ opinions (e.g., Miller (1977), Varian 
(1985), Harris and Raviv (1993), Hong and Stein (1999) and Berkman et al. (2009)). To 
respond to this element, this paper develops both a theoretical model and an empirical 
proxy for the divergence of investors’ opinions at the announcement of earnings to 
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investigate its effect on immediate market reaction and post–earnings announcement 
returns. 
For this paper, I develop a static market equilibrium pricing model based on the 
Daniel et al. (1998) and Kyle (1985) classic models. The key modification lies in the 
assumption of the market equilibrium price setting process instead of assuming that big 
traders dominate price-setting. I use this model to examine the possible impact on the 
price movements and trading volume around earnings announcements when institutional 
investors (i.e., informed) and individual investors (i.e., uninformed) agree or disagree 
with each other. The model’s implications suggest that the divergence of opinion has a 
negative relation with the immediate market reaction, but a positive relation with the 
subsequent stock price drift. There are many other theoretical models that examine the 
impact of the divergence of investors’ opinions on corporate news events (e.g., Miller 
(1977), Varian (1985), Harris and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995); Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003); etc.). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first one to 
specifically examine the impact of divergence of opinions between individual and 
institutional investors on the market reaction to earnings surprises. 
My proxy for the divergence of opinion between institutional and individual 
investors is the difference between sell side analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts and 
the whisper earnings forecasts posted on whispernumber.com3. In this paper, the term 
“divergence of opinion” is not used in its conventional way, i.e., as a measure of many 
different views (e.g., as a dispersion) but merely as the discrepancy in average opinions 
                                                            
3 A search engine and proprietary software are utilized to examine thousands of messages per day on key Internet 
message boards that gather whisper numbers on stocks.  
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between sophisticated and unsophisticated investor groups. I justify my use of this 
earnings forecast difference as a proxy for the divergence of investors’ opinions in two 
ways. First, it is reported that 95% of the earnings whisper numbers provided by 
whispernumber.com are from individual investors.4 And sell side analysts’ consensus 
earnings forecasts are generally viewed as a proxy for institutional investors’ 
expectations.5  Second, the difference between these two forecasts also measures the 
uncertainty of public information available to all investors before an earnings 
announcement. When informed investors update their expectations upon receiving private 
information, a higher uncertainty of public information will lead to a lower weight for 
public information and a higher weight for private information. Therefore higher 
uncertainty of public information will also lead to a larger divergence of opinion between 
informed and uninformed investors. Using this proxy, I find empirical evidence that 
supports a negative relation between the divergence of opinion and the immediate market 
reaction and a positive relation between the divergence of opinion and the subsequent 
stock price drift. 
This paper is most closely related to the work by Anderson et al. (2007), which 
empirically examines the relationship between the divergence of opinions and post-
earnings announcement drift. They construct a measure of opinion divergence from the 
dispersion of order flow across NASDAQ market makers, and they find that higher levels 
of opinion divergence surrounding the announcements lead to increased post-earnings 
                                                            
4 Forsyth, Randall, W. “The Electronic Investor.” Barron’s Technology Week, February 24, 2003, pp. T4. 
 
5 For example, the I/B/E/S Annotated Bibliography of Earnings Expectations Research (1992) lists over 
280 abstracts of working papers and published articles that perform empirical tests using these data. 
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announcement drift. However, they restrict their sample to NASDAQ-traded firms and do 
not focus on the divergence of opinion between individual and institutional investors.  
Leading up to the earnings announcement, there is uncertainty associated with 
future earnings and firm value, which leads to different expectations among investors. 
Generally speaking, greater disagreement leads to higher trading volume, the typical 
proxy for opinion dispersion in many other studies (Bamber (1986, 1987), Kandel and 
Pearson (1995), Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (2004), Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) etc.). 
But theoretical models provide ambiguous predictions about trading volume around 
earnings announcements. In the Kyle (1985) model, informed traders will exploit their 
private information. Meanwhile, uninformed investor’s liquidity trading is exogenous. 
Therefore trading volume increases in information asymmetry. On the other hand, 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) argue that trading 
volume can actually decrease in information asymmetry because some liquidity traders 
postpone their trading until the information asymmetry is resolved. This argument is 
further empirically supported by Chae (2005), who finds that trading volume is 
negatively correlated with levels of information asymmetry before scheduled 
announcements (e.g., earnings announcements) and positively correlated with 
information asymmetry after scheduled announcements. My model’s implication also 
suggests an undetermined prediction about trading volume around earnings 
announcements. Later in this paper, I find empirical evidence suggesting a negative 
relation between the divergence of investors’ opinions and the abnormal trading volume 
around an earnings announcement. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the 
intuition and implications of the static market equilibrium model; Section 3 constructs 
testing samples and variables; Section 4 reports empirical findings; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. MARKET REACTION TO EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT 
This section develops a static market equilibrium pricing model, which is 
constructed based on the Daniel et al. (1998) and Kyle (1985) classic models. The key 
modification lies in the assumption of the market equilibrium price setting process around 
the time of earnings announcements. For detailed information about this model 
construction and its implications, please see Appendix I. 
A. The role of individual investors 
Daniel et al. (1998) assume that individual investors have no role in setting the 
stock price because institutional investors dominate price-setting. Many studies have 
questioned this strong assumption. If sophisticated institutional investors are risk averse 
and there are some budget constraints on the institutional investors’ arbitrage trading, 
they will not be able to completely exploit arbitrage profits (Hirshleifer et al. (2008)). 
Further, limits to short selling can also prevent prices from adjusting to reflect the views 
of sophisticated investors (Lamont and Thaler (2003)). According to the Securities 
Industry Fact Book 2002 (Securities Industry Association. 2002), from 1991 to 2001 
individual investors held 39 to 53 percent of the market value of total equities. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that individual investors play a significant role in price-setting. 
48 
 
B.  Intuition behind the model 
In Kyle’s (1985) model, informed investors use uninformed investors’ liquidity 
trades to camouflage their informed trading activity. Informed investors will choose the 
optimal order size to maximize expected trading profit considering the adverse impact of 
their trades on the market equilibrium price. So the ex-post market equilibrium price 
reflects the expectations of both informed and uninformed investors. 
 If investors are assumed rational in that they are Bayesian optimizers, they update 
their expectations upon receiving new information based on Bayes’ rule. After informed 
investors receive private information, they become more confident about their own 
beliefs and assign a lower weight for the subsequent public information they receive it. 
Without access to private information, uninformed investors have to count on public 
information and assign a higher weight for it when they update their expectations. The 
difference in the weights assigned for public information leads to more prominent market 
underreaction to public news when informed and uninformed have divergent expectations 
than when they share identical views upon receiving the public information. Specifically, 
when informed investors undervalue the stock before a positive earnings announcement, 
the partial adjustment of their expectation will refrain the market price from fully 
reflecting the good news. 
C. A simple example of model’s implications 
In this section, I use a simplified example to illustrate the major implications of 
the market equilibrium model.  
49 
 
There are four groups of participants in this model: 1) informed investors; 2) 
uninformed investors without discretion, whose trading is random and exogenous; 3) 
uninformed investors with discretion, who can postpone their trading at no cost if they 
perceive the level of asymmetric information is high; and 4) competitive market makers. 
All parties are Bayesian optimizers. 
There are four dates. On day 0, every party begins with their endowments and 
identical prior beliefs. I assume the prior valuation for a stock is $20. Since every party 
agrees on it, the market makers set market price of the stock to be $20. On day 1, only 
informed investors receive a noisy private signal about underlying security value and 
form an updated valuation belief ($10 per share). Without any access to the private 
signal, uninformed investors keep their belief unchanged ($20 per share). Following the 
theorem 1 introduced in Kyle’s 1985 paper, the expected market equilibrium price is the 
average of the expected value from informed and uninformed investors ($15). 
On day 2, the firm announces its earnings, which implies the underlying value 
should be $18. Each individual in the market updates their beliefs. Uninformed investors 
with discretion will not trade since they perceive a high level of information asymmetry 
based on the significant price movement on day 1. Confident about their private beliefs, 
informed investors assign a 25% weight on the public information and update their 
expectation to $12 per share. On the other hand, uninformed investors assign a 75% 
weight on the public information and update their expectation to $18.5 per share. Then 
the equilibrium market price for that stock on day 2 is $15.25. 
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Assume an alternative scenario that there is also a public signal on day 1 along 
with the private signal, so every party will update their belief upon receiving the public 
signal, however informed investors will further update their belief based on the private 
signal they receive. To make this alternative scenario easy to compare, I further require 
that on day 1 the market price is $15. Since every party agrees on this price, uninformed 
investors with discretion will trade this time. On day 2 when the firm announces earnings 
implying the underlying value should be $18, every party will update their beliefs 
accordingly and the new market equilibrium price is $16.5.  
On day 3, conclusive public information arrives, the security pays a liquidation 
dividend of $17, and consumption occurs. 
Overall, this model indicates the divergence of opinion has a negative relation 
with the market immediate reaction, however a positive relation with the subsequent drift. 
In other words, everything else equal, when informed and uninformed investors agree 
with each other, the market reaction to earnings is more complete and the subsequent 
drift is less prominent. This suggests uninformed investors should also have some impact 
on the market reactions to public news and PEAD could be partly attributed to the 
divergence of opinion between informed and uninformed investors. This finding is 
graphically illustrated in Figure 1. As for trading activity around the earnings 
announcement, the model gives an ambiguous prediction. When the level of asymmetric 
information is high, informed investors will trade more to exploit their private 
information, but uninformed investors with discretion may stop trading because the 
expected trading loss outweighs the gain from the satisfaction of liquidity needs, and vice 
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versa. Whether the divergence of opinion will increase or decrease aggregate trading 
volume is not clear from the model’s prediction. This needs to be examined empirically. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF MODEL IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, I conduct series of empirical tests to study the following three 
predictions derived from the model and applied to the post-earnings-announcement drift 
anomaly. 
Prediction 1: Divergence of investors’ opinions has a negative relation with the 
immediate market reaction to earnings surprises.  
Prediction 2: Divergence of investors’ opinions has a positive relation with the 
subsequent stock price drift.  
Prediction 3:  Trading volume around earnings announcements decreases 
inversely to divergence of opinion if the additional trades made by informed investors are 
not enough to compensate for the decreases of trades from discretionary liquidity traders, 
and vice versa. 
A. Proxy for divergence of investors’ opinion 
I use the difference between institutional analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts 
and the mean whisper earnings forecasts posted on whispernumber.com as a proxy for the 
divergence of opinion between institutional and individual investors. It is reported that 
95% of the earnings whisper numbers provided by whispernumber.com are from 
individual investors. Therefore these whisper numbers can be used as a proxy for 
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individual investors’ expectations. On the other hand, institutional sell side analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts are generally viewed as a proxy for institutional investors’ 
expectations. Thus, the difference between these two average forecasts directly measures 
the divergence of opinion between these two groups of investors. 
There is an alternative logic supporting the validity of this proxy. The difference 
between these two average forecasts also measures the uncertainty of public information 
( ߪ଴
ଶ in the model) available to all investors before an earnings announcement. 
Uninformed investors do not have access to private information, so their belief is based 
purely on public information. As for informed investors, a higher uncertainty of public 
information will lead to a lower weight assigned to the public information and a larger 
weight for private information when informed investors update their beliefs upon 
receiving it. Therefore higher uncertainty of public information will also lead to larger 
divergence of opinion between informed and uninformed investor groups.  
Conventionally, institutional investors are regarded as informed investors and 
individual investors are considered to be uninformative. But a recent study by Kaniel et al. 
(2012) argue that aggregated individuals possess private information and their trading 
could be informative even if only a small proportion of the population obtains anything 
meaningful. Although there has been some question as to whether individual or 
institutional investors represent informed investors, the difference between these two 
groups of investors’ mean expectation still measures the divergence of opinion between 
informed and uninformed investors. 
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B. Sample construction 
The whisper mean forecasts are manually collected from a web site currently 
owned and operated by Whispernumber.com, which is an independent financial research 
firm that collects earnings expectations from the investment public. According to 
Whispernumber.com, whisper numbers are “the expectations of the mass demographic of 
individual investors, floor traders, investment advisors, and market strategists for 
quarterly earnings. It is their analysis (or expectations) based on shared information, 
fundamental research, past earnings performance, 'gut feel', media, press release, and 
corporate information. Whisper number offers in-depth analysis of investor sentiment and 
expectations of a company's earnings.”  However, a recent article in Barron’s states, 
“Contrary to what has been reported, whispernumber.com doesn’t represent analysts,” 
and that 95% of the whispers provided by this web site are from individual investors and 
only 5% are from brokers. Whisper consensus forecasts posted on Whispernumber.com 
have been used as an alternative earnings expectation proxy by many studies, such as 
Zaima and Harjoto (2005), Bhattacharya et al. (2006) and Dewally (2008). My whisper 
number sample spans 11 years, from January 1999 to December 2009. For each firm’s 
quarterly earnings announcement, only the most recent earnings whisper forecasts are 
kept. I also exclude any whisper forecasts reported one month before or more than two 
days after the actual earnings announcement day.  
Stock return data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). Firm specific accounting data is from COMPUSTAT. Quarterly analyst 
unadjusted earnings forecasts and actual reported earnings are downloaded from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). To remove obsolete forecasts, only the 
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analyst earnings forecasts issued within 90 days before earnings announcements are used 
to calculate the consensus forecast. I obtain the daily risk-free rate, the 3x2 size BM 
portfolio daily return and size deciles directly from Professor Kenneth French’s website. 
After gathering all the data sets together, I use the following criteria to clean my 
sample: 
1) Both quarter t and quarter t+1 earnings announcement dates should be reported 
in I/B/E/S. 
2) All firms should have a December fiscal year ending. 
3) The price per share should be available from CRSP as of the end of quarter t, 
and is greater than $5. This reduces noise caused by small standardized unexpected 
earnings deflators and “penny stocks”. 
4) The market value of equity at the end of quarter t−1 should be available from 
CRSP and is larger than $5 million. This eliminates very small firms with low liquidity, 
as well as firms that just went public or were close to liquidation. 
5) The firm’s shares should be traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ. 
6) Daily returns should be available from CRSP during the following quarter after 
an earnings announcement day. 
7) Data should be available to assign the firm to one of the six Fama–French 
portfolios based on size and B/M. 
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8) The actual earnings reported from I/B/E/S and those reported from 
Whispernumber.com should be consistent. 
There are 7,094 valid observations left in the final sample. To help the reader 
better understand characteristics of firms for which I find whisper numbers, I provide 
summary statistics for all qualified observations in Table 2.1.  
Panel A in Table 2.1 reports firm specific sample descriptive statistics (stock 
price, number of shares outstanding and the market value at the end of the previous 
quarter, book value reported by the end of previous fiscal year and the book-to-market 
ratio). Panel B reports the distribution of firms across size deciles, the distribution over 
different years and the distribution within different industries classified by two-digit SIC 
codes. All observations are sorted into 10 size deciles based on the corresponding 
month’s size-decile breakpoints reported on Professor Kenneth French’s website. Results 
indicate that the majority of the sample firms are “big firms” which lie in the largest three 
deciles. The number of whisper forecasts increases dramatically from 1999 (111 
whispers) until 2008 (946 whispers) and decreases a little bit thereafter. Firms with two-
digit SIC codes of 73 (business services), 36 (electronic & other electric equipment) and 
28 (chemicals & allied products) are the top three groups that have received the most 
whisper forecasts. 
C. Trading volume at the time of earnings announcement 
Following Chae (2005), I use abnormal log turnover as the measure of trading 
volume. It corrects for the number of outstanding shares as well as skewness and kurtosis 
of the raw turnover. It provides a cleaner interpretation of the results. 
56 
 
 ܮ݋݃ ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ൫߬௜,௧൯ = ݈݋݃ (
ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃ ܸ݋݈ݑ݉ ௜݁,௧
ܱݑݐݏݐܽ݊݀݅݊݃ ܵℎܽݎ݁ݏ௜,௧
) (1) 
 ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ(߳௜,௧) =  ߬௜,௧ − ߬పഥ  , ݓℎ݁ݎ݁ ߬పഥ =
∑ ߬௜,௧
௧ୀିଵଵ
௧ୀିସ଴
30
 (2) 
D. Earnings forecast errors 
Most of the studies on whisper numbers focus on their accuracy and 
representativeness of investors’ expectations relative to institutional analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. However, most of these results are mixed (e.g. Bagnoli et al. (1999), Zaima and 
Harjoto (2005), Bhattacharya et al. (2006) and Dewally (2008)). Following these studies, 
I calculate unscaled forecast errors for each firm-quarter based on whisper consensus 
forecasts and analyst consensus forecasts: 
UFE it = Actual it – Forecast it, (3) 
where UFE it = unscaled forecast error for firm i’s earnings in quarter t, Actual it 
= actual earnings per share for firm i in quarter t, Forecast it = a forecast measure of 
earnings per share for firm i in quarter t. 
To control for size, I also use the stock price scaled forecast errors:  
SFE it = UFE it /Price i,t-1 (4) 
where  SFE it = price scaled forecast error for firm i’s earnings in quarter t, Pricet-1 
= the closing price of that stock on the first day of the forecast period.6 
                                                            
6 I also used the stock closing price on the last day of the forecast period as well as standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts as deflation factor. The results remain qualitatively the same. 
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Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for two groups of forecast errors. Results 
indicate that the unscaled analyst consensus forecasts are pessimistic relative to the actual 
earnings (mean errors are significantly larger than zero at any significance level), which 
is consistent with Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki’s (1999) finding that analysts ‘walk 
down’ their estimates to a level the firm is likely to beat. Unscaled whisper forecast errors 
are on average less biased than analyst consensus forecasts but still significantly 
pessimistic relative to actual earnings. I also find that the difference between these two 
unscaled consensus forecast errors is significantly positive at the 1% level.  
When I compare the price scaled consensus forecast errors, the results change. 
That is, whisper consensus forecasts are on average unbiased, whereas analyst consensus 
forecasts remain pessimistic relative to actual earnings. The difference between these two 
forecast errors is still significantly positive at any significance level. Overall, the results 
indicate that whisper consensus forecasts are on average less pessimistic than analyst 
consensus forecasts and whisper consensus forecasts are less biased compared with 
analyst consensus forecasts irrespective of being scaled by price or not. 
Next I compare the accuracy of whisper forecasts and analyst consensus forecasts 
relative to real earnings. I calculate the mean squared error (MSE) of each type of 
forecast: 
ܯܵܧ = ෍
(ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜௧  –  ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜௧ )ଶ
݊
 (5) 
  
As shown in Table 2.2 Panel C, whisper consensus forecasts’ mean square error is 
significantly smaller than that of consensus forecasts at any significance level. It implies 
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that whisper consensus forecasts are more accurate than analyst consensus forecasts, 
possibly because whisper consensus forecasts are generated from a broader group of 
investors than analyst consensus forecasts.7 
I further examine earnings forecast errors across different firm size deciles (Panel 
D) and along different years (Panel E). The previous result still holds for firms with a 
high market value, and most of the biases are from forecasts on large firms. In terms of 
forecast mean square error, whisper consensus forecasts are more accurate than analyst 
consensus forecasts, but the difference is only statistically significant for large firms. 
Panel E reports the earnings forecast errors across years. Analyst consensus raw forecast 
errors are generally significantly positive except in the last two years when the financial 
crisis took place. Whisper consensus forecasts are overoptimistic during the bubble 
period from 1999 to 2001 then become pessimistic thereafter. The differences between 
these two forecast errors (both raw and price adjusted) and the error square difference are 
consistently significant for 7 out of 11 years. 
Overall, these results indicate that whisper consensus forecasts are more 
optimistic and more accurate than analyst consensus forecasts. This pattern is persistent 
across the years before the financial crisis and is mainly concentrated in large firms. 
 
  
                                                            
7 Another reason could be that consensus whisper number forecasts reported on Whispernumber.com 
usually come out during the last week before earnings announcements. Thus, most of the information in 
analysts’ forecasts has already been incorporated into whisper consensus forecasts. 
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4. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF MODEL IMPLICATIONS 
A. The relation between divergence of investors’ opinions and the immediate market 
reaction to earnings surprise.  
In this section, I examine market reaction to earnings announcements when 
institutional and individual investors have different expectations. The divergence of 
opinion is measured as the difference between analysts’ consensus forecasts and whisper 
consensus forecasts. Based on the model’s implications, I expect that investors’ 
divergence of opinion should have an incremental impact on the market reaction to 
earnings announcements.  
All sample firms are grouped into quarter cohorts. For each cohort, I 
independently assign these firms into quintiles by their price-scaled forecast error based 
on analyst consensus and whisper consensus forecasts. After the firms are assigned into 
these 5x5 groups, I calculate the event day (-1,1) three-day size and book-to-market 
adjusted mean abnormal return as a measure of market reaction to earnings 
announcements for each group. Results are reported in Table 2.3 as well as Figure 2. 
The far-right column in Table 2.3 presents average cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) of groups sorted based on whisper consensus forecasts earnings surprise; 
whereas the bottom row presents average CARs of groups sorted based on analysts’ 
consensus earnings surprise. The difference between the top and bottom whisper 
consensus forecast error quintiles is 5.44% (2.85% − [−2.59%]) and the difference 
between extreme analyst consensus forecast error quintiles is 5.39% (2.39%− [−3.00%]). 
Neither measure of earnings surprise subsumes the other, which is consistent with the 
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model implication that investors’ divergence of opinion has an incremental impact on the 
market reaction to public news events.  
Finally, I find that the cells with the largest negative/positive CARs are the cells 
representing both the most negative/positive whisper and analyst forecast surprise. A 
zero-investment trading strategy yields a return of 7.44% (3.82% − [−3.62%])—
substantially larger than that obtained by using either surprise measure independently. 
Since the difference between two forecasts is a proxy for divergence of investors’ 
opinions, these findings suggest the divergence of expectations between individual and 
institutional investors does have a direct impact on the market immediate reaction to 
earnings surprises. That is, when individual investors share similar opinions as that of 
institutional investors, market reactions to earnings surprises are more complete, and vice 
versa. 
B. The relation between divergence of investors’ opinions and the Post Earnings 
Announcement Drift  
After examining the immediate market reaction to earnings, in this section I 
examine the possible impact on PEAD when two groups of investors have different 
expectations. Based on the model implications, if individual investors hold divergent 
opinions from institutional investors their trading will cause the market to under react to 
earnings surprises, which directly affects subsequent price adjustments. It is expected that 
conditional on the earnings surprise based on analysts’ forecasts, when whisper 
consensus forecasts have different interpretations of reported earnings than that of analyst 
consensus forecasts we should observe more prominent drifts after the announcement.  
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The structure of Table 2.4 is similar to that of Table 2.3. All the firms are 
independently assigned into 5x5 groups. Then I calculate the event day (1, 90) three-
month size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal mean return for each group. Results 
are reported in Table 2.4. The far-right column and the bottom row report average CARs 
of groups single sorted based on whisper consensus forecasts and analyst consensus 
forecasts.  
Interestingly, I find little pattern of post earnings announcement drift if I calculate 
surprise based on whisper forecasts. It seems the well documented PEAD is not driven by 
the earnings whisper consensus forecasts surprises. The PEAD pattern is still prominent 
if I use analyst forecasts based earnings surprises. The cumulative abnormal return 
magnitude is different from those reported in other studies mainly because my sample 
firms are concentrated in large firms, which are reported to have less prominent drifts 
than smaller firms.  
The major finding in Table 2.4 is revealed when I compare the diagonal CARs 
with the adjacent off-diagonal CARs. None of the five diagonal CARs are significant at 
the 5% significance level. However, if I hold the analyst forecast error constant, those 
CARs become larger and more significantly different from 0 as I move from the diagonal 
cells to the off-diagonal cells. The top-right and bottom-left corners of the table are the 
groups with the largest divergence of opinion. Their magnitudes of drift are the largest 
among all the cells in Table 2.4. Overall, there is some evidence indicating that 
divergence of investors’ opinions could lead to a large subsequent drift. Figure 2 also 
graphically illustrates this finding. 
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C. The relation between divergence of investors’ opinions and the trading volume at 
the earnings announcement. 
Next, I examine how trading volume changes at the time of the earnings 
announcement when two groups of investors have different expectations. Based on the 
model implications, it is unclear how trading volume will change as divergence of 
opinions changes, so I test this prediction empirically. It is expected that conditional on 
the earnings surprise based on analysts’ forecasts, trading volume around earnings 
announcements should decrease inversely to the divergence of opinion if the additional 
trades made by informed investors are not enough to compensate for the decreases of 
trades from discretionary liquidity traders, and vice versa. 
Again, all the firms are independently assigned into 5x5 groups. Then the event 
day (-1, +1) three-day average daily abnormal trading volume (ABV) is calculated for 
each group. Results are reported in Table 2.5. The far-right column and the bottom row 
report average ABVs of groups single sorted based on whisper consensus forecasts and 
analyst consensus forecasts.  
I find little pattern of average daily abnormal trading volume at earnings 
announcement regardless of whether I calculate surprise based on whisper or analysts’ 
consensus forecasts. However, I find that for each column, the diagonal cell has the 
largest abnormal trading volume, and it decreases monotonically as I move from the 
diagonal cells to the off-diagonal cells. Overall, there is strong evidence implying that 
divergence of investors’ opinion could lead to a lower average daily abnormal trading 
volume at earnings announcement. 
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D. Regression Analysis  
In this section, I conduct a series of regression analyses to examine the 
explanatory power of divergence of investors’ opinions on announcement trading 
volume, market immediate reaction as well as the post earnings announcement drift. 
Earnings surprises are measured based on either analyst consensus forecasts or whisper 
consensus forecasts.  
To examine the cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcement, I 
carry out the following three regressions8: 
 ܥܣ ௝ܴ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁ ௝,௧൯ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧ , (6) 
 ܥܣ ௝ܴ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܹℎ݅ݏ݌݁ݎ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁௝,௧൯ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧ , (7) 
 ܥܣ ௝ܴ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁௝,௧൯ + 
ܿ൫ܹℎ݅ݏ݌݁ݎ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁௝,௧൯ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧, 
(8) 
Control variables include: Log_size (natural log of market value of the firm), BM 
(book to market ratio), EPS (price adjusted current quarter earnings per share), 
Negative_EPS (a dummy variable equals 1 for negative earnings, 0 otherwize) and Num 
of Analyst (number of analysts that issued earrings forecasts on that firm during current 
quarter).  2-digit SIC code dummies are added to control for industry fixed effects and sta 
 Panel A in Table 2.6 reports regression results for (-1, 1) three-day market 
reactions to earnings surprises. The dependent variables are the (-1, 1) three-day CARs. 
Consistent with the model’s first implication as well as findings in Table 2.3, earnings 
surprises based on whisper consensus forecasts and analysts’ consensus forecasts have 
                                                            
8 I also use alternative models such as including an interaction of the Whisper and Analyst quintiles or the difference 
between Whisper and Analyst quintiles to capture the disagreement between the two groups, I find similar results. 
64 
 
incremental power in explaining the market reaction to earnings. When both forecast 
errors are included in the model, the results indicate that both coefficients are positive 
and highly significant. R2adj is significantly improved from 4.77% to 6.06%, and the sum 
of the two coefficients (1.672) is larger than both of the coefficients when only one of the 
forecast error variables is included in the model. This confirms the divergence of opinion 
based underreaction hypothesis. That is, when both groups of investors agree with each 
other, the market tends to react more prominently to earnings surprises. 
Panel B reports regression results for three-month post earnings announcement 
drift following earnings surprises. The dependent variables are three-month CARs. 
Consistent with the extant literature, I find that earnings surprises based on analysts’ 
consensus forecasts significantly explain post earnings announcement drift. However I 
find no evidence that those earnings surprises, based on whisper forecasts, can explain 
the drift. Surprisingly, when two earnings surprises are included in the regression model, 
the R2 is also significantly improved from the model using only one of the two forecast 
errors, and both coefficients are highly significant with the reversed sign. The coefficient 
of Analyst forecast error quintile is positive and has a larger magnitude than the negative 
coefficient of Whisper forecast error quintile. This indicates that the direction of the drift 
is mainly based on the analyst forecast surprise. Conditional on the analyst consensus 
forecasts earnings surprise, when individual investors tend to have different expectations, 
the drift will be more prominent.  
To examine the average daily abnormal trading volume around earnings 
announcement, I carry out another set of regressions: 
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ܣܤ ௝ܸ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅  ݁௝,௧൯
+ ܿ൫ܳݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁ ܦ݂݂݅݁ݎ݁݊ܿ  ݁௝,௧൯ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧ , (9) 
ܣܤ ௝ܸ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܹℎ݅ݏ݌݁ݎ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅  ݁௝,௧൯ 
+ܿ൫ܳݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁ ܦ݂݂݅݁ݎ݁݊ܿ  ݁௝,௧൯ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧ , (10) 
ܣܤ ௝ܸ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅  ݁௝,௧൯
+ ܾ൫ܳݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁ ܦ݂݂݅݁ݎ݁݊ܿ  ݁௝,௧൯
+ ܿ൫ܹℎ݅ݏ݌݁ݎ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅  ݁௝,௧൯
+ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧, 
(11) 
where Quintile Difference is the absolute value of the difference between analyst 
and whisper forecast error quintile. 
Panel C reports regression results for (-1, 1) three-day abnormal trading volume 
around earnings announcement. The dependent variables are the (-1, 1) three-day average 
daily abnormal trading volume. Consistent with the last model prediction as well as 
findings in Table 2.5, divergence of investors’ opinions has significant power in 
explaining the average daily abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements 
after controlling for the earnings surprises measured by either analysts’ consensus 
forecasts or whisper consensus forecasts. However, these two measures of earnings 
forecast error, themselves, basically have no explanatory power on the abnormal 
announcement trading volume.  
E. Robustness Tests 
So far all the results indicate that when individual investors agree with 
institutional investors. The market tends to react more promptly to earnings news, 
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abnormal trading volume increases at the time of announcement, and there is no 
significant subsequent drift. However, when these two groups have different expectations, 
the market reaction to earnings surprises tend to be more muted and abnormal 
announcement trading volume drops, but with a prominent subsequent drift.  
In this section I investigate the robustness of my results. First, I use two-stage 
least square regression to purge the part of whisper forecast errors that can be explained 
by analyst forecast error, analyst forecast dispersion, analyst forecast spread and other 
control variables. The first stage regression is carried out as: 
ܹℎ݅ݏ݌݁ݎ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௝,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ௝,௧൯ 
+ܿ(݈ܽ݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݀݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊) + ݀(݈ܽ݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀)
+ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧ 
(12) 
Then I collect the residual as the new measure for whisper forecast error and 
assign a new quintile ranks to each new whisper forecast error every quarter. In the 
second stage, previous Whisper forecast error rank is replaced by the new Whisper 
forecast error rank. I carry out following regressions: 
ܥܣ ௝ܴ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁௝,௧൯
+ ܿ൫ܹℎ݅ݏ݌݁ݎ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݎ݁ݏ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁௝,௧൯
+ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ߝ௝,௧ 
(13) 
ܣܤ ௝ܸ,௧ = ܽ + ܾ൫ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ ݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݍݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅  ݁௝,௧൯
+ ܿ൫ܳݑ݅݊ݐ݈݅݁ ݎ݁ݏ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ ܦ݂݂݅݁ݎ݁݊ܿ  ݁௝,௧൯ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ
+ ߝ௝,௧ , 
(14) 
Regression outputs are reported in Table 2.7. As the results indicate, my findings 
remain unchanged when I use the residual from the first stage regression as the measure 
67 
 
for Whisper earnings forecast error. 
Since more recent earnings forecasts contain more information and they are more 
relevant to the analysts’ expectation as time gets closer to the earnings announcement. I 
control for the timeliness of analysts’ earnings forecasts by constructing another analyst 
consensus forecast measure based on the forecasts issued within 30 days before earnings 
announcements. Table 2.8 reports the regression results for the new analyst consensus 
measure, and I find my findings qualitatively unchanged. 
I also investigate the causal relationship between my findings and my measure of 
the divergence of opinion. A legitimate concern with my findings is that, when analysts 
as a whole disagree with individual investors, those analysts are also very likely to 
disagree among themselves and my findings could be driven by the disagreement among 
analysts. To deal with this potential concern, I rerun all multiple regressions after 
controlling for the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, which is most commonly 
used as the proxy for diversity in analysts’ opinions (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina 
(2002)). The results do not qualitatively change after I control for the divergence of 
analysts’ opinion. The results are reported in Table 2.9 (models (1), (5) and (9)). 
Another factor that could confound my findings is the divergence of opinions 
among all investors. Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) consider unexplained volume as an 
indicator of opinion divergence among investors and find it is positively related with 
earnings announcement returns. This finding is consistent with Varian (1985), who 
suggests that opinion divergence may be treated as an additional risk factor. So, the 
upward drift after a positive earnings surprise could be attributed to the exposure to this 
risk factor; however, this argument still cannot help explain the negative drift. To 
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alleviate this concern, I rerun the multiple regressions after controlling for the 
announcement abnormal trading volume. Again, the results still hold (Table 2.9 models 
(2) and (6)). 
For my last robustness check, I consider the effect of earnings quality that could 
also possibly contaminate my findings. Chan et al. (2001) find that low-quality earnings 
that are accompanied by high accruals are associated with poor future returns. And the 
divergence of investors’ opinions is expected to be negatively correlated with the 
earnings quality. I use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality (higher 
discretionary accrual levels mean lower earnings quality), and all the findings remain 
unchanged after I control for earnings quality (Table 2.9 models (3), (7) and (10)). 
Finally, after controlling for all these concerns simultaneously, I find these effects 
do not significantly change my results (Table 2.9 models (4), (8) and (11)). 
  
69 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Post earnings announcement drift has remained one of the most well-known 
anomalies, since its first documentation by Ball and Brown (1968).  This paper extends 
the current literature on the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift by providing some 
evidence showing that the divergence of opinion between individual and institutional 
investors has some explanatory power on the market’s immediate response to earnings as 
well as the post earnings announcement drift. 
I first constructed a discrete static model to simulate the market reaction to public 
news when individual (uninformed) and institutional (informed) investors have divergent 
opinions. The model implications indicate that there is a negative relation between 
divergence of opinion and the immediate market reaction but also a positive relation 
between divergence of opinion and subsequent stock price drift. 
After illustrating the intuition of the model, I conducted a series of empirical tests 
to directly test the model’s implications. I use the difference between institutional 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts and whisper consensus earnings forecasts posted 
on whispernumber.com to proxy for the divergence of opinion between these two groups 
of investors. The results indicate that the divergence of investors’ opinions has an 
incremental impact on market reactions to earnings as well as the subsequent drift as 
predicted. I also find some evidence of the negative relation between abnormal trading 
volume around earnings announcement and divergence of investors’ opinion. 
Overall, I conclude that the divergence of opinions between individual and 
institutional investors has an impact on market reaction to earnings surprises, the trading 
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volume at the time of announcement and the subsequent price adjustment. That is, when 
these two groups of investors agree with each other, announcement trading volume 
increases and the market tends to react more promptly to earnings news with no 
subsequent drift. However, when these two groups have different expectations, 
announcement trading volume decreases and the market reactions to earnings surprises 
tend to be more muted, but with a prominent subsequent drift.  
71 
 
6. REFERENCES  
Admati, A., Pfleiderer, P., 1988. A theory of intraday patterns: Volume and price 
variability. Review of Financial Studies 1, 3-40. 
 
Ajinkya, B., Atiase, R., Gift, M., 2004. Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs, Differential 
Interpretation and the Consensus Effect of Quarterly Earnings Signals. Working 
paper. 
 
Anderson, K., Harris, J., So, E. 2007. Opinion Divergence and Post-Earnings 
Announcement Drift. Working paper.  
 
Bagnoli, M., Beneish, MD.,Watts, SG., 1999. Whisper forecasts of quarterly earnings per 
share. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, 27-50 
 
Ball, R. 1992. The earnings-price anomaly. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15, 
319-345. 
 
Ball, R., Brown, P., 1968. An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. 
Journal of Accounting Research 6, 159-178. 
 
Bamber, L., 1986. The information content of annual earnings releases: A trading volume 
approach. Journal of Accounting Research 24, 40-56. 
 
Bamber, L., 1987. Unexpected earnings, firm size, and trading volume around quarterly 
earnings announcements. Accounting Review 62, 510-532. 
 
Berkman, H., Dimitrov, V., Jain, P., Koch, P., Tice, S. 2009. Sell on the news: 
Differences of opinion, short-sales constraints, and returns around earnings 
announcements. Journal of Financial Economics 92, 376-399. 
 
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K., 1989. Post-earnings-announcement drift: Delayed price 
response or risk premium? Journal of Accounting Research 27, 1-48. 
 
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K., 1990. Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 13, 305-340. 
 
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K., and Wahlen, J., 1997. Accounting-based stock price 
anomalies: Separating market inefficiencies from risk. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 14, 89-136. 
 
Bhattacharya, N, Sheikh, A. Thiagarajan, SR., 2006. Does the market listen to whispers? 
The Journal of Investing 15, 16-24. 
72 
 
Chae, J., 2005. Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and Timing Information. The 
Journal of Finance 60, 413-442 
 
Chan, K., Chan, L., Jegadeesh, N., Lakonishok, J., 2006. Earnings Quality and Stock 
Returns. The Journal of Business 79, 1041-1082.  
 
Daniel, K. D., Hirshleifer, D. Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor psychology and security 
market under and over-reactions. The Journal of Finance 53, 1839-1886. 
 
Daniel, K. D. Titman, S., 2006. Market reactions to tangible and intangible information. 
The Journal of Finance 61, 1605-1643. 
 
Dechow, P. M., and Sloan, R. G., 1997. Returns to contrarian investment strategies: Tests 
of naïve expectations hypotheses.” Journal of Financial Economics 41, 3-27. 
 
DeLong, J., Shleifer, A. Summers, L. Waldmann, R., 1991. The survival of noise traders 
in financial markets. Journal of Business 64, 1-20. 
 
Dewally M. 2008. The informational value of earnings whispers. American Journal of 
Business; 23, 37-51. 
 
Diether, K., Malloy, C. and Scherbina, A., 2002. Differences of Opinion and the Cross 
Section of Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 57, 2113-2141. 
 
Fama, E. F. 1998. Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal 
of Financial Economics 49, 283-306. 
 
Fischer, P., Verrecchia, R., 1999. Public information and heuristic trade. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 27, 89-124. 
 
Foster, F. Douglas, Viswanathan, S., 1990. A theory of the interday variations in volume, 
variance, and trading costs in securities markets. Review of Financial Studies 3, 
593-624. 
 
Garfinkel, J.  Sokobin, J., 2006. Volume, Opinion Divergence, and Returns: A Study of 
Post-Earnings Announcement Drift. Journal of Accounting Research, 44, 85-112. 
 
Harris, M., Raviv, A., 1993. Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race. Review of 
Financial Studies 6, 473-506. 
 
Hirshleifer, D., Teoh, S. H., 2003. Limited attention, information disclosure, and 
financial reporting.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 337-386. 
 
Hirshleifer, D. Myers, J., Myers, L., Teoh, S. H. 2008. Do individual investors drive post-
earnings announcement drift? Direct evidence from personal trades. The 
Accounting Review 83, 1521-1550. 
73 
 
 
Hong, H., Stein J., 1999. A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading and 
Overreaction in Asset Markets. Journal of Finance 54, 2143-85. 
 
Kaniel, R, Liu, S., Saar, G., Titman, S. 2011. Individual Investor Trading and Return 
Patterns around Earnings Announcements. The journal of finance forthcoming. 
  
Kandel, E., Pearson, N. D., 1995. Differential interpretation of public signals and trade in 
speculative markets. The Journal of Political Economy 103, 831-872. 
 
Konchitchki, Y., Lou, X., Sadka, G. and Sadka, R. 2010. On the Predictability of Analyst 
Forecast Errors and the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift. Working paper 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446929 
 
Kyle, A. S., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315-1336. 
 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. R. Vishny, W., 1994. Contrarian investment, extrapolation 
and risk. The Journal of Finance 49, 1541-1578. 
Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H., 2003. Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial 
Markets.”  The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 191-202. 
Lee, C. M. C.. 2001. Market efficiency and accounting research: A discussion of “Capital 
market research in accounting” by S. P. Kothari. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 31, 233-253. 
 
Lee, C. M. C. Swaminathan, B., 2000. Price momentum and trading volume. The Journal 
of Finance 55, 2017-2069. 
 
Mendenhall, R. 2004. Arbitrage risk and post-earnings-announcement drift. Journal of 
Business 77, 875-894. 
 
Miller, E., 1977. Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 
1151-68. 
 
Sadka, R. 2006. Momentum and the post-earnings-announcement drift anomalies: The 
role of liquidity risk. Journal of Financial Economics 80, 309-349. 
 
Securities Industry Association. 2002. Securities Industry Fact Book. New York, NY: 
Securities Industry Association. 
 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. The limits to arbitrage. The Journal of Finance 52, 35-55. 
 
Varian, H., 1985. Divergence of Opinion in Complete Markets: A Note. Journal of 
Finance 40, 309-17. 
 
74 
 
Zaima, J. K. Harjoto, M.A. 2005. Conflict in Whispers and Analyst Forecasts: Which 
One Should Be Your Guide? Financial Decisions Article 6. 
75 
 
Table 2.1 Summary statistics* 
Panel B. Sample Distribution  
                                               Size Year                 Industry 
Size_Group Frequency Percent 
 
year Frequency Percent 
 
SIC_2 Frequency Percent 
1 119 1.68  
1999 111 1.56  
73 816 11.5 
2 273 3.85  
2000 446 6.29  
36 793 11.18 
3 262 3.69  
2001 409 5.77  
28 757 10.67 
4 295 4.16  
2002 551 7.77  
60 539 7.6 
5 462 6.51  
2003 972 13.70  
49 416 5.86 
6 452 6.37  
2004 872 12.29  
35 389 5.48 
7 643 9.06  
2005 858 12.09  
38 368 5.19 
8 983 13.86  
2006 906 12.77  
63 325 4.58 
9 1553 21.89  
2007 944 13.31  
37 226 3.19 
10 2052 28.93  
2008 761 10.73  
48 191 2.69 
    
2009 264 3.72     
 
*Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for sample firms. Panel A reports firm specific sample descriptive statistics. Panel B reports 
distribution of firms across size deciles, the distribution over different years and the distribution within different industries classified 
by two-digit SIC code. All observations are sorted into 10 size deciles based on the size-decile breakpoints reported on Prof. Kenneth 
French’s website in the same month.  
Panel A. Firms specific summary statistics for whisper sample during 1999-2009. 
Variable N Mean STD 10th Pctl 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 90th Pctl 
Price 7094 41.42 35.45 12.59 21.53 35.29 52.92 73.07 
Shares (millions) 7094 567.24 1,257.73 32.45 77.31 181.03 437.25 1,347.00 
Market Cap (millions) 7094 23,426.67 52,028.19 690.07 2,093.97 6,762.43 18,451.73 54,739.01 
Book Value (millions) 7094 7,535.86 16,795.11 183.58 650.56 2,090.63 7,066.60 16,912.00 
BM 7094 0.42 0.37 0.12 0.21 0.35 0.55 0.79 
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Table 2.2 Earnings forecast errors from whisper and analysts’ consensus forecasts* 
Panel A. Raw Forecast Error N Mean Median StdDev Pr > |t| 
Analyst Consensus 7094 0.0653 0.0200 0.3861 <.0001 
Whisper Number 7094 0.0102 0.0100 0.2252 0.0001 
Difference 7094 0.0551 0.0100 0.3190 <.0001 
 
     Panel B. Price Adjusted Error 
Analyst Consensus 7094 0.0013 0.0006 0.0145 <.0001 
Whisper Number 7094 0.0002 0.0002 0.0113 0.2368 
Difference 7094 0.0011 0.0004 0.0115 <.0001 
 
     Panel C. Raw Error Square 
Analyst Consensus 7094 0.1533 0.0016 1.9077 <.0001 
Whisper Number 7094 0.0508 0.0009 0.9786 <.0001 
Difference 7094 0.1025 0.0000 1.6444 <.0001 
 
Panel D. Earnings forecast errors across firm size deciles 
Size 
Decile  N Raw Forecast Error Price Adjusted Error Raw Error Square 
  Analyst 
Consensus 
Whisper 
Number 
Difference Analyst 
Consensus 
Whisper 
Number 
Difference Analyst 
Consensus 
Whisper 
Number 
Difference 
1 119 0.009 -0.016** 0.026*** 0.000 -0.001 0.002*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.004** 
2 273 0.005 -0.003 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.056 0.015** 0.041 
3 262 0.023 0.003 0.020 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.057 0.010*** 0.048 
4 295 0.045*** 0.012 0.034*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.033*** 0.020*** 0.014 
5 462 0.072*** 0.017** 0.054*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.003** 0.168 0.030** 0.138 
6 452 -0.006 -0.028 0.021 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.454 0.178 0.276 
7 643 0.031 -0.002 0.034*** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.191** 0.116 0.075*** 
8 983 0.064*** 0.018*** 0.045*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.124*** 0.039*** 0.085*** 
9 1553 0.104*** 0.018*** 0.086*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.142*** 0.040*** 0.101*** 
10 2052 0.081*** 0.015*** 0.066*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.145*** 0.038 0.108*** 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel E. Earnings forecast errors over years 
 
Year N Raw Forecast Error Price Adjusted Error Raw Error Square 
  Analyst 
Consensus 
Whisper 
Number 
Difference Analyst 
Consensus 
Whisper 
Number 
Difference Analyst 
Consensus 
Whisper 
Number 
Difference 
1999 111 0.080*** -0.005 0.084*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.037*** 0.014*** 0.023** 
2000 446 0.054** 0.003 0.051** 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.276 0.010*** 0.266 
2001 409 0.021 -0.011** 0.033 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.334** 0.009*** 0.325** 
2002 551 0.076*** 0.009** 0.066*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.049*** 0.008*** 0.041*** 
2003 972 0.104*** 0.012 0.092*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.117*** 0.060 0.057*** 
2004 872 0.108*** 0.013*** 0.094*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.089*** 0.016*** 0.073*** 
2005 858 0.117*** 0.026*** 0.091*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.110*** 0.015*** 0.095*** 
2006 906 0.074*** 0.026*** 0.048*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.089*** 0.017*** 0.072*** 
2007 944 0.042*** 0.022*** 0.021 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.200 0.026*** 0.173 
2008 761 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.190** 0.176** 0.013 
2009 264 -0.074** -0.062 -0.012 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.369** 0.329** 0.040 
 
*Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics for earnings forecast errors. Panel A through Panel C report descriptive statistics of unscaled 
earnings forecast errors (computed as actual reported earnings minus forecasts), price scaled forecast errors and the square of unscaled 
earnings forecast errors. Panel D reports earnings forecast errors across different firm size groups and Panel E reports earnings 
forecast errors along different years. Analyst Consensus stands for the mean consensus analysts’ forecasts reported within the 90 days 
before earnings announcement; Whisper Number is the most recent whisper consensus earnings forecast reported by 
Whispernumber.com. Difference is measured as analyst consensus minus whisper number forecasts. The reported p-values are based 
on the null hypothesis that the mean value is not different from 0. ***, **and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.3 Divergence of investors’ opinions and the immediate market reaction to earnings surprise* 
  Analyst Forecast Error Quintile  
 Lowest (20%) 2 3 4 Highest (20%) All 
Whisper 
Forecast Error 
Quintile 
Lowest (20%) -3.62%*** -1.86%*** -0.86% -0.37% -0.02% -2.59%*** 
 
854 226 102 95 123 1405 
       2 -2.20%*** -1.40%*** 0.99%* -0.31% -0.24% -0.91%*** 
 
310 630 273 151 148 1512 
       3 -2.22%** -0.72%** 1.03%*** 0.50% 1.06%*** 0.22% 
 
84 414 466 187 184 1336 
       4 -2.18% 0.60% 1.84%*** 2.19%*** 1.85%*** 1.63%*** 
 
65 173 472 505 218 1434 
       Highest (20%) 1.40% 0.40% 0.88% 2.12%*** 3.82%*** 2.85%*** 
 
37 47 109 484 737 1417 
 
        All -3.00%*** -0.99%*** 1.14%*** 1.51%*** 2.39%*** 
  
 
1350 1490 1422 1422 1410 
  
*Table 2.3 reports the (-1,1) size and BM adjusted portfolio mean abnormal returns constructed by analyst consensus and whisper 
forecast errors. Firstly, all sample firms are grouped into quarter cohorts. Then for each cohort, they are independently divided into 
quintiles by their price adjusted forecast error based on analyst consensus and whisper number forecasts. The far-right column 
presents average CARs of groups sorted based on whisper number earnings surprise, whereas the bottom row presents average CARs 
of groups sorted based on analyst consensus earnings surprise. After all the firms are assigned into these 5x5 groups, event day (-1,1) 
three-day size and book to market adjusted mean abnormal returns are calculated for each group.***, **and * denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.4 Divergence of investors’ opinions and the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift* 
  Analyst Forecast Error Quintile  
 Lowest (20%) 2 3 4 Highest (20%) All 
Whisper 
Forecast Error 
Quintile 
Lowest (20%) -0.74% -0.38% -1.83% -0.93% 7.20%*** -0.08% 
 854 226 102 95 123 1405 
 
      2 -2.97%*** -1.20%* -0.33% 0.24% -0.02% -1.15%*** 
 310 630 273 151 148 1512 
 
      3 -2.93% -1.64%** -0.90% -0.30% 0.43% -0.99%** 
 84 414 466 187 184 1336 
 
      4 0.83% -1.17% -2.66%*** -0.34% 1.81%* -0.82%* 
 65 173 472 505 218 1434 
 
      Highest (20%) -4.08% -0.21% -2.27%* -1.52%* 0.73% -0.37% 
 37 47 109 484 737 1417 
  
       All -1.41%** -1.16%*** -1.55%*** -0.71% 1.34%*** 
   1350 1490 1422 1422 1410 
  
*Table 2.4 reports the (1,90) three-month size and BM adjusted portfolio mean abnormal returns constructed by analyst consensus and 
whisper forecast errors. Firstly, all sample firms are grouped into quarter cohorts. Then for each cohort, they are independently 
divided into quintiles by their price adjusted forecast error based on analyst consensus and whisper number forecasts. The far-right 
column presents average CARs of groups sorted based on whisper number earnings surprise, whereas the bottom row presents average 
CARs of groups sorted based on analyst consensus earnings surprise. After all the firms are assigned into these 5x5 groups, event day 
(1,90) three-month size and book to market adjusted mean abnormal returns are calculated for each group.***,**and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Divergence of investors’ opinions and the trading volume at the earnings announcement* 
  Analyst Forecast Error Quintile  
 Lowest (20%) 2 3 4 Highest (20%) All 
Whisper 
Forecast Error 
Quintile 
Lowest (20%) 0.54*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.51*** 0.39*** 0.51*** 
 857 214 100 95 123 1389 
 
2 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 
 315 622 273 149 147 1506 
 
      3 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 
 86 406 462 185 185 1324 
 
      4 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.55*** 0.47*** 0.51*** 
 66 167 468 501 217 1419 
 
      Highest (20%) 0.46*** 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.52*** 0.60*** 0.55*** 
 37 47 106 479 732 1401 
  
       All 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 
   1361 1456 1409 1409 1404 
 *Table 2.5 reports the (-1,+1) three-day abnormal turnover around quarterly earnings announcements. All sample firms are grouped 
into quarter cohorts. Then for each cohort, they are independently divided into quintiles by their price adjusted forecast error based on 
analyst consensus forecasts and whisper consensus forecasts. The far-right column presents average three-day abnormal turnover of 
groups sorted based on whisper consensus forecast error, whereas the bottom row presents average three-day abnormal turnover of 
groups sorted based on analyst consensus forecast error. After all the firms are assigned into these 5x5 groups, the abnormal turnover 
is calculated as the difference between average of daily log turnover over (-1,+1) interval and average daily log turnover (estimated 
from the benchmark period t = −40 to t = −11). The number of observations within that portfolio is given beneath their corresponding 
figures. ***,**and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,respectively.  
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Table 2.6 Regression analysis of model implications* 
  Panel A. (-1, 1) Immediate Reaction 
 
Panel B. (1, 90) Post Earnings Drift Panel C. (-1, 1) Abnormal Turnover  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)   Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
Intercept -3.478 -2.695 -3.936 -6.463 -4.605 -6.125 0.947 0.952 0.945 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AF_Score 1.316 0.814 0.626 0.996 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.218) 
AW_Score 1.321 0.858 -0.067 -0.633 0.006 0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.690) (0.002) (0.153) (0.650) 
Score_Diff -0.039 -0.037 -0.039 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log_Size 0.109 0.025 0.087 0.340 0.280 0.356 -0.038 -0.039 -0.039 
 
(0.185) (0.763) (0.289) (0.034) (0.081) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.171 0.018 0.170 3.311 3.125 3.311 -0.093 -0.093 -0.093 
(0.704) (0.968) (0.706) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EPS -1.525 0.697 -3.885 3.819 11.172 5.560 -1.528 -1.502 -1.534 
 
(0.836) (0.924) (0.598) (0.826) (0.530) (0.752) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative_EPS -0.625 -0.686 -0.538 -1.127 -1.371 -1.191 -0.201 -0.202 -0.201 
 
(0.354) (0.313) (0.425) (0.496) (0.408) (0.472) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Num of Analysts 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.024 0.019 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.516) (0.485) (0.636)   (0.626) (0.499) (0.586)   (0.310) (0.317) (0.306) 
N  7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,034 7,034 7,034 
R2 4.77% 4.93% 6.06%   0.72% 0.50% 0.87%   3.65% 3.63% 3.65% 
 *Table 2.6 reports regression results for (-1, 1) three-day market reactions to earnings surprises, (1, 90) three-month post earnings 
announcement drift following earnings surprises and (-1, 1) three-day abnormal turnover around earnings announcements. P-values 
are reported in parenthesis under corresponding coefficients. I control for fixed effects at the industry level using 2-digit SIC codes. 
Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
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Table 2.7 Two-stage least square regression results* 
  
(-1, 1) Immediate 
Reaction 
 
(1, 90) Post Earnings 
Drift 
 (-1, 1) Abnormal 
Turnover  
Intercept 
 
-4.429 
   
-5.775 
   
0.926 
 
  
(<.0001) 
   
(0.000) 
   
(<.0001) 
 AF_Score 1.265 0.663 0.006 
  
(<.0001) 
   
(<.0001) 
   
(0.131) 
 AW_Res_Score 
 
0.777 
   
-0.562 
     
  
(<.0001) 
   
(0.001) 
     Score_Res_Diff 
         
-0.017 
 
          
(<.0001) 
 Log_Size 0.050 0.383 -0.037 
  
(0.545) 
   
(0.018) 
   
(<.0001) 
 BM 
 
0.028 
   
3.414 
   
-0.088 
 
  
(0.950) 
   
(0.000) 
   
(<.0001) 
 EPS 
 
5.573 
   
-1.311 
   
-1.498 
 
  
(0.451) 
   
(0.941) 
   
(<.0001) 
 Negative_EPS -0.771 -1.022 -0.192 
  
(0.252) 
   
(0.537) 
   
(<.0001) 
 Num of 
Analysts 
 
0.012 
   
0.016 
   
-0.001 
   
 
(0.471) 
   
(0.644) 
   
(0.313) 
 N  
 
7,094 
   
7,094 
   
7,034 
 
R2 
 
6.35% 
 
  
 
0.90% 
 
  
 
3.19% 
  
*Table 2.7 reports regression results for (-1, 1) three-day market reactions to earnings 
surprises, (1, 90) three-month post earnings announcement drift following earnings 
surprises and (-1, 1) three-day abnormal turnover around earnings announcements. 
AF_Score stands for the earnings surprise quintile based on analyst consensus forecast 
and AW_Res_Score stands for the earnings surprise quintile based on the portion of 
whisper forecast error that cannot be explained by the analyst forecast error, analyst 
forecast dispersion, analyst forecast spread and other control variables. Score_Res_Diff is 
the absolute difference between AF_Score and AW_Res_Score. Log_size is the natural 
log of market value of the firm. BM is the book to market ratio. EPS is price adjusted 
current quarter earnings per share. Negative_EPS is a dummy variable equals 1 for 
negative earnings, 0 otherwise. Num of Analyst is the number of analysts issued earrings 
forecasts on that firm during current quarter.  P-values are reported in parenthesis under 
corresponding coefficients. I control for fixed effects at the industry level using 2-digit 
SIC codes. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
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Table 2.8 Regression results for more recent analyst consensus forecasts* 
  
(-1, 1) Immediate 
Reaction 
 
(1, 90) Post Earnings 
Drift 
 (-1, 1) Abnormal 
Turnover  
Intercept 
 
-3.989 
   
-5.226 
   
0.979 
 
  
(<.0001) 
   
(0.007) 
   
(<.0001) 
 Recent_AF_Scor
e 
 
1.122 
   
0.530 
   
0.001 
 
  
(<.0001) 
   
(0.037) 
   
(0.897) 
 AW _Score 
 
0.460 
   
-0.318 
     
  
(<.0001) 
   
(0.198) 
     Score_Res_Diff 
         
-0.028 
 
          
(<.0001) 
 Log_Size 
 
0.114 
   
0.340 
   
-0.043 
 
  
(0.220) 
   
(0.071) 
   
(<.0001) 
 BM 
 
0.233 
   
3.225 
   
-0.073 
 
  
(0.654) 
   
(0.004) 
   
(0.003) 
 EPS 
 
-6.639 
   
-18.186 
   
-1.451 
 
  
(0.397) 
   
(0.319) 
   
(0.000) 
 Negative_EPS 
 
-1.007 
   
-2.383 
   
-0.169 
 
  
(0.176) 
   
(0.202) 
   
(<.0001) 
 Num of Analysts 
 
0.011 
   
0.016 
   
-0.001 
   
 
(0.519) 
   
(0.665) 
   
(0.179) 
 N  
 
5,588 
   
5,588 
   
5,547 
 
R2 
 
6.49% 
 
  
 
0.60% 
 
  
 
3.41% 
  
*Table 2.8 reports regression results for (-1, 1) three-day market reactions to earnings 
surprises, (1, 90) three-month post earnings announcement drift following earnings 
surprises and (-1, 1) three-day abnormal turnover around earnings announcements. 
Recent_AF_Score stands for the earnings surprise quintile based on analyst consensus 
forecast within 30 days before earnings announcement and AW _Score stands for the 
earnings surprise quintile based on whisper forecast error. Score_Rec_Diff is the absolute 
difference between Recent_AF_Score and AW _Score. Log_size is the natural log of 
market value of the firm. BM is the book to market ratio. EPS is price adjusted current 
quarter earnings per share. Negative_EPS is a dummy variable equals 1 for negative 
earnings, 0 otherwise. Num of Analyst is the number of analysts issued earrings forecasts 
on that firm during current quarter.  P-values are reported in parenthesis under 
corresponding coefficients. I control for fixed effects at the industry level using 2-digit 
SIC codes. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
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Table 2.9 Robustness tests* 
  (-1, 1) Immediate Reaction   (1, 90) Post Earnings Drift   (-1, 1) Abnormal Volume  
 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Model 
(7) 
Model 
(8) 
 
Model 
(9) 
Model 
(10) 
Model 
(11) 
Intercept -4.026 -1.279 -1.724 0.302 
 
-5.834 -6.689 -2.160 -1.282 
 
0.948 0.984 1.004 
 
(0.000) (0.112) (0.156) (0.790) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.433) (0.658) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AF_Score 0.799 0.410 0.584 0.285 
 
1.008 1.005 1.496 1.275 
 
0.008 0.007 0.010 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.101) (0.323) (0.182) 
AW_Score 0.851 0.400 0.691 0.390 
 
-0.652 -0.659 -0.912 -1.113 
 
0.004 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
 
(0.433) (0.745) (0.717) 
Score_Diff 
          
-0.040 -0.049 -0.051 
           
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Positive_STDEV 49.589 
  
26.606 
 
-59.445 
  
230.527 
 
-5.334 
 
-8.109 
 
(0.303) 
  
(0.634) 
 
(0.628) 
  
(0.119) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.002) 
Negative_STDEV 53.694 
  
255.484 
 
-165.988 
  
314.449 
 
-1.550 
 
-9.902 
 
(0.174) 
  
(0.052) 
 
(0.120) 
  
(0.133) 
 
(0.358) 
 
(0.039) 
Positive_Abn_Vol 
 
1.471 
 
1.326 
  
0.649 
 
0.566 
    
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.020) 
  
(0.447) 
 
(0.607) 
    Negative_Abn_Vol 
 
-3.407 
 
-3.665 
  
0.753 
 
-2.121 
    
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.309) 
 
(0.069) 
    Positive_Abs_DA 
  
7.144 -5.408 
   
-98.637 -106.132 
  
-0.219 -0.217 
   
(0.524) (0.629) 
   
(0.001) (0.000) 
  
(0.663) (0.670) 
Negative_Abs_DA 
  
-37.446 -23.545 
   
-21.234 -12.874 
  
0.287 0.264 
   
(0.002) (0.045) 
   
(0.465) (0.660) 
  
(0.619) (0.648) 
Log_Size 0.088 0.060 -0.027 -0.038 
 
0.359 0.377 0.133 0.150 
 
-0.039 -0.038 -0.039 
 
(0.285) (0.436) (0.817) (0.722) 
 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.593) (0.553) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.068 0.045 -0.926 -1.593 
 
3.587 3.478 0.687 -0.149 
 
-0.088 -0.208 -0.189 
 
(0.881) (0.922) (0.170) (0.024) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.608) (0.915) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 2.9 (Continued) 
 
 
EPS 4.086 -5.964 3.609 8.357 
 
-15.137 7.215 6.770 29.428 
 
-1.930 -1.496 -2.308 
 
(0.628) (0.407) (0.679) (0.428) 
 
(0.505) (0.684) (0.802) (0.330) 
 
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
Negative_EPS -0.513 -0.959 -0.086 -1.016 
 
-1.301 -0.876 0.346 -0.345 
 
-0.200 -0.233 -0.222 
 
(0.446) (0.156) (0.932) (0.329) 
 
(0.431) (0.598) (0.888) (0.890) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NO of Analysts 0.008 0.012 0.022 0.022 
 
0.019 0.019 0.013 0.010 
 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.627) (0.456) (0.255) (0.254) 
 
(0.591) (0.591) (0.758) (0.810) 
 
(0.296) (0.001) (0.002) 
N  7,094 7,034 3,663 3,660 
 
7,094 7,034 3,663 3,660 
 
7,034 3,660 3,660 
R2 6.14% 8.58% 6.34% 9.34% 
 
1.00% 0.91% 1.35% 1.71% 
 
3.76% 5.33% 5.69% 
 
*Table 2.9 reports robustness tests for (-1, 1) three-day market reactions to earnings surprises,  (1, 90) three-month post earnings 
announcement drift following earnings surprises and (-1, 1) three-day abnormal turnover around earnings announcements. AF_Score 
stands for the earnings surprise quintile based on analyst consensus forecast and AW_Score stands for the earnings surprise quintile 
based on whisper forecast. Score_Diff is the absolute difference between AF_Score and AW_Score. STDEV is the price adjusted 
quarterly analyst earnings forecast standard deviation. Abn_Vol is the mean abnormal trading volume (-1, 1) around earnings 
announcements. Abs_DA stands for the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Positive_variable means the corresponding variable 
multiply a dummy variable positive, which equals 1 if the sum of AF_Score and AW_Score is larger than 6, 0 otherwise. 
Negative_variable means the corresponding variable multiply a dummy variable negative, which equals 1 if the sum of AF_Score and 
AW_Score is less than 6, 0 otherwise. Log_size is the natural log of market value of the firm. BM is the book to market ratio. EPS is 
price adjusted current quarter earnings per share. Negative_EPS is a dummy variable equals 1 for negative earnings, 0 otherwize. Num 
of Analyst is the number of analysts issued earrings forecasts on that firm during current quarter.  P-values are reported in parenthesis 
under corresponding coefficients. I control for fixed effects at the industry level using 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are adjusted 
for firm-level clustering. 
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Figure 2.1 Model implications* 
*This figure illustrates the main implications of the model. Blue line indicates the situation when two groups of investors disagree 
with each other and red line shows the situation when investors share similar expectations. It indicates that when investors share 
similar opinions the market reaction to earnings surprise is more complete and the subsequent drift is less prominent compared to 
when investors disagree with each other.  
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Figure 2.2 Stock price movements around earnings announcements* 
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*This figure plots the event day (-1, 1) size and BM adjusted portfolio mean 
abnormal returns constructed by analyst consensus and whisper forecast errors. 
*This figure plots the event day (1, 90) three-month size and BM adjusted portfolio 
mean abnormal returns constructed by analyst consensus and whisper forecast errors.  
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APPENDIX 1: 
STATIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
To determine the market equilibrium price, I follow Kyle (1985) model structure 
and notations. In the model, I refer to informed investors as I, uninformed investors 
without discretion as U and competitive market makers as M. I assume the informed 
investors are risk neutral, their utility function is based on the trading profit. Whereas 
uninformed investors’ utility function depends on the satisfaction of liquidity needs only, 
they will trade for liquidity reasons under any circumstances. Following Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990), I assume a second group of 
uninformed liquidity traders UC with timing discretion. Their utility function is based on 
the satisfaction of liquidity needs and the loss from trading, and they can stop their 
trading without any cost if the expected trading loss exceeds the liquidity needs.  
All parties begin with their endowments and identical prior beliefs. The ex post 
liquidation value of the underlying asset, denoted  ݒ෤ , is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean ̅ݒ  and variance σ௩ଶ . I set ̅ݒ  = 0 without loss of generality. The 
quantity traded by U, denoted ݑ෤ , is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ߪ௎
ଶ. 
The quantity traded by discretionary liquidity traders UC is either 0 (they do not trade 
because the expected trading loss outweighs the satisfaction of liquidity needs) or ݑ෤஼ , 
which is also normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ߪ஼
ଶ. The random variables ݑ෤ , 
ݑ෤஼  and ݒ෤  are independent of each other. For a detailed model structure, please see 
Appendix II. 
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There are four dates. On Day 0, the security terminal value ݒ෤ is realized (ݒ෤ = ݒ); 
however, it is unobservable to any party. All parties begin with their endowments and 
identical prior beliefs. The common prior distributions of ݒ෤  from both I and U are 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance  ߪ଴
ଶ . Since every party 
shares the same expectation, the market makers sets market price ݌଴= 0. 
On Day 1, only I receive a noisy private signal about the underlying security 
value (SI = ݒ+ߝ, where ߝ~ܰ (0, ߪఌ
ଶ)) and form an updated valuation belief (ܰ (ݒூଵ , ߪூଵ
ଶ )). 
Without any access to the private signal, U and Uc keep their beliefs on date 1 unchanged 
as ܰ (0, σ଴
ଶ).  
Trading is structured in two steps. In step one, U will trade ݑ෤ଵ  for liquidity 
reasons, where ݑ෤ଵ~ܰ(0, ߪ௎
ଶ) and it is not observable to I. After observing the private 
signal SI, I exploit their monopoly power by taking into account the effect the quantity he 
chooses to trade in step one is expected to have on the price established in step two. In 
other words, I trade ݔ෤ଵ to maximize the expected profit ෤߮ଵ = (ݒூଵ − ݌෤ଵ)ݔ෤ଵ. M can only 
observe ݔ෤ଵ + ݑ෤ଵ, but not ݔ෤ଵ or ݑ෤ଵ separately. Since I are expected to make a profit at the 
expense of uninformed investors, Uc will not trade on day 1. In step two, M determine the 
price ݌෤ଵ at which he trades the quantity necessary to clear the market. Therefore ݌෤ଵ can 
be denoted as a deterministic function of  ݔ෤ଵ + ݑ෤ଵ , ݌෤ଵ = ଵܲ(ݔ෤ଵ + ݑ෤ଵ)  and ݔ෤ଵ  as a 
deterministic function of ݒ + ߝ, ݔ෤ଵ = ܺଵ(ݒ + ߝ). The trading profits of market makers are 
driven to 0 if I assume a Bertrand auction between at least two market makers. 
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Following Kyle (1985), I define market equilibrium as a pair ଵܲ and ܺଵ, such that 
the following two conditions hold: 
(1) Profit Maximization: For any alternate trading strategy ܺଵ
ᇱ and for any 
ݒ + ߝ, 
 ܧ{ ෤߮ଵ( ଵܲ, ܺଵ)|Sூ =  ݒ + ߝ} ≥ ܧ{ ෤߮ଵ( ଵܲ, ܺଵ
ᇱ)|Sூ =  ݒ + ߝ}. (1) 
 (2) Zero profit of market makers driven by Bertrand auction:  
 ଵܲ(ݔ෤ଵ + ݑ෤ଵ) = ܧ{ݒ෤ூଵ|ݔ෤ଵ + ݑ෤ଵ}. (2) 
 Following the theorem 1 introduced in Kyle’s (1985) paper, trades and 
equilibrium prices are listed directly. For detailed deductions, please see Kyle (1985). 
ݔ෤ଵ =
ఙబ
ఙ಺భ
(ݒூଵ − ݒ௎ଵ),  (3) 
݌ଵ = ݒ௎ଵ +
ߪூଵ
2ߪ଴
(ݔ෤ଵ + ݑ෤ଵ). (4) 
If I substitute the first expression into the second equation, I will get 
݌ଵ = ݒ௎ଵ +
ߪூଵ
2ߪ௎ଵ
൬
ߪ௎ଵ
ߪூଵ
(ݒூଵ − ݒ௎ଵ) + ݑ෤ଵ൰ = ݒ௎ଵ +
1
2
(ݒூଵ − ݒ௎ଵ +
ߪூଵ
ߪ௎ଵ
ݑ෤ଵ) 
    ݌ଵ =
ଵ
ଶ
(ݒூଵ + ݒ௎ଵ +
ఙ಺భ
ఙೆభ
ݑ෤ଵ).    
(5) 
Since ݑ෤ଵ~ܰ(0, σ௨
ଶ ) and ܧ(ݑ෤ଵ) = 0, therefore   
ܧ(݌ଵ) =
1
2
(ݒூଵ + ݒ௎ଵ). (6) 
In other words, the expected market equilibrium price is the average of the 
expected values from informed and uninformed at that time.  
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By the end of day, Uc will compare ݌ଵ and ݒ௎ଵ to infer whether I have received 
material private information. If ݌ଵ and ݒ௎ଵ are significantly different (|݌ଵ − ݒ௎ଵ| > ܦ , 
where D is the threshold used by Uc), then it indicates I possess material private 
information and are expected to carry over their information advantage to next day. So Uc 
will not trade on Day 2 either. On the other hand, if ݌ଵ  and ݒ௎ଵare not significantly 
different from each other (|݌ଵ − ݒ௎ଵ| < ܦ), then following the same logic, Uc will start 
to trade again on Day 2. 
On Day 2, a noisy public signal (ܵߨ = ݒ + ߨ, where ߨ~ܰ (0, ߪగ
ଶ)), for example 
earnings announcement, arrives. Each individual in the market updates their beliefs and 
further trades occur. Similar to Day 1, U will trade ݑ෤ଶ  for liquidity reasons, where 
ݑ෤ଶ~ܰ(0, ߪ௨ଶ) . The order amount UC will trade is either 0 (when ݌ଵ  and ݒ௎ଵ  are 
significantly different) or ݑ෤௖ଶ~ܰ(0, ߪ௖ଶ).  ݑ෤௖ଶ, ݑ෤ଵ, ݑ෤ଶ and ݒ෤ are independent of each other. 
I will trade ݔ෤ଶ to maximize the expected profit ෤߮ଶ = (ݒூଶ − ݌෤ଶ)ݔ෤ଶ. M can only 
observe ݔ෤ଶ + ݑ෤ଶ + ݑ෤௖ଶ but not ݔ෤ଶ, ݑ෤ଶ ݋ݎ ݑ෤௖ଶ separately. But M can compare ݌ଵ and ݒ௎ଵto 
infer whether UC trades or not. M determines the price ݌෤ଶ = ଶܲ(ݔ෤ଶ + ݑ෤ଶ + ݑ෤௖ଶ , ݒ + ߨ) at 
which he trades the quantity necessary to clear the market. ݌෤ଶ  reflects the impact of 
public signal ܵߨ on the value of underlying security, as well as the order flow ݔ෤ଶ + ݑ෤ଶ +
ݑ෤௖ଶ. The differing variance of beliefs about the value and signals are common knowledge 
to all. In other words ߪ௨ଶ, ߪ଴
ଶ, ߪఌଶ  and ߪగଶ are common knowledge to every party. 
After similar calculations are done for Day 1, the trade and equilibrium price for 
Day two are calculated as: If Uc do not trade: 
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ݔ෤ଶ =
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
(ݒூଶ − ݒ௎ଶ), (7) 
݌ଶ = ݒ௎ଶ +
ߪூଶ
2ߪ଴
(ݔ෤ଶ + ݑ෤ଶ). (8) 
If Uc trade:  
ݔ෤ଶ =
ඥߪ଴
ଶ + ߪ௖ ଶ
ߪூଶ
(ݒூଶ − ݒ௎ଶ), (7)’ 
݌ଶ = ݒ௎ଶ +
ߪூଶ
2ඥߪ଴
ଶ + ߪ௖ ଶ
(ݔ෤ଶ + ݑ෤ଶ + ݑ෤௖ଶ). (8)’ 
 
Again, since E(ݑ෤ୡଶ) = 0 and E(ݑ෤ଶ) = 0, therefore  
ܧ(݌ଶ) =
1
2
(ݒூଶ − ݒ௎ଶ). (9) 
On Day 3, conclusive public information arrives, the security pays a liquidation 
dividend ݒ, and consumption occurs.  
In sum, I have the following market equilibrium prices indicated by my model: 
݌଴ = 0, (10) 
E(݌ଵ) =
ଵ
ଶ
(ݒூଵ + ݒ௎ଵ)  =
ଵ
ଶ
ܧூ[ݒ|ݒ + ߝ] +
ଵ
ଶ
ܧ௎[ݒ], (11) 
E(݌ଶ) =
ଵ
ଶ
(ݒூଶ + ݒ௎ଶ)  =
ଵ
ଶ
ܧூ[ݒ|ݒ + ߝ, ݒ + ߨ]+
ଵ
ଶ
ܧ௎[ݒ|ݒ + ߨ], (12) 
݌ଷ = ݒ, (13) 
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After calculating the Bayesian updated posterior distribution mean valuation from 
each party on Day 1 and Day 2, I obtain the expressions for the prices on these two days:  
݌ଵ =
1
2
×
ߪ଴
ଶ
(ߪ଴
ଶ + ߪఌଶ)
(ݒ + ߝ) =
ߪ଴
ଶ(ݒ + ߝ)
2(ߪ଴
ଶ + ߪఌଶ)
, (14) 
݌ଶ =
1
2
× ቆ
(ߪగଶ + ߪఌଶ)ߪ଴
ଶ
ܦூ
ݒ +
ߪగଶߪ଴
ଶ
ܦூ
ߝ +
ߪఌଶߪ଴
ଶ
ܦூ
ߨቇ +
1
2
×
ߪ଴
ଶ
(ߪ଴
ଶ + ߪగଶ)
(ݒ + ߨ), (15) 
where ܦூ = ߪఌ
ଶߪ଴
ଶ + ߪగ
ଶ(ߪ଴
ଶ + ߪఌ
ଶ). 
For tractability, I define: 
ݒூଵ =
ߪ଴
ଶ
(ߪ଴
ଶ + ߪఌଶ)
(ݒ + ߝ), (16) 
ߪூଵ
ଶ =
ߪ଴
ଶߪఌଶ
ߪ଴
ଶ + ߪఌଶ
. (17) 
Finally, I have 
݌ଵ =
ݒூଵ
2
, (18) 
݌ଶ =
1
2
×
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + ݒூଵߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ +  
1
2
×
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ  (19) 
 In next section, I will this model to simulate the market reaction to earnings 
announcements when individual (uninformed) and institutional (informed) investors have 
divergent opinions. 
A. Post-earnings-announcement drift  
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In this section I use this static model to examine the impact of divergent 
expectations between I and U on the price movements around the earnings 
announcements. Daniel et al. (1998) argues PEAD may be a continuous overreaction 
triggered by the earnings announcement to pre-event information. In other words, stocks 
exhibit PEAD while the market gradually adjusts to the previous overvaluation. Based on 
their findings, I examine the possible impact on PEAD when I and U agree or disagree by 
using the modified model.  
Conventionally, the earnings surprise is measured as the difference between 
actual earnings and the consensus analyst forecasts, standardized by the stock price or 
actual earnings. Sample firms are usually divided into tercile- or quintile-groups based on 
their standardized earnings surprise. First, let’s focus on the subgroup of stocks with the 
most positive earnings news. According to Daniel et al. (1998), firms with positive 
earnings surprises are significantly undervalued right before an earnings announcement. 
Positive earnings news causes a positive market reaction adjusting the stock price 
towards its intrinsic value. The post-earnings-announcement drift is the continuing 
correction of previous under valuation. In my model, positive earnings surprises 
correspond to the scenario with the following constraints:          
1) ݌ଵ < ݒ,  (previous under valuation)     (20) 
2) ݌ଵ < ݒ + ߨ,  (positive earnings surprise)     (21) 
3) ݒூଵ ≤ ݒ௎ଵ = 0.        (22) 
The last constraint is from the assumption that the top quintile group consists of 
firms with best earnings surprises measured based on analyst consensus mean forecasts. 
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So uninformed investors can only either agree with informed investors (ݒூଵ = ݒ௎ଵ) and 
treat the earnings announcement as good news, or they disagree (ݒூଵ < ݒ௎ଵ) and do not 
treat the reported earnings as good news. 
Next, I examine the market reaction to earnings under two different scenarios:  
Scenario A: Everything else equal ( ݌ଵ
∗ = ݌ଵ, ݌ଷ
∗ = ݌ଷ = ݒ  and same public 
signal ܵߨ), I and U agree with each other on date 1 (ݒூଵ
∗ = ݒ௎ଵ
∗ ).  
Based on equation (18) and (19), the market equilibrium price on Day 1 and Day 2 are:  
ݒூଵ
∗ = ݒ௎ଵ
∗ = ݌ଵ
∗ = ݌ଵ, (23) 
and  
݌ଶ
∗ =
1
2
×
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ +
1
2
×
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ  (24) 
Scenario B: Everything else equal ( ݌ଵ
∗∗ = ݌ଵ, ݌ଷ
∗∗ = ݌ଷ = ݒ  and same public 
signal ܵߨ), I and U disagree with each other (ݒூଵ ≠ ݒ௎ଵ ), 
which implies: 
ݒூଵ
∗∗ = ݌ଵ
∗∗ − ܿ = ݌ଵ − ܿ, (25) 
ݒ௎ଵ
∗∗ = ݌ଵ
∗∗ + ܿ = ݌ଵ + ܿ, (26) 
and 
݌ଶ
∗∗ =
1
2
×
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + (݌ଵ − ܿ)ߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ +
1
2
×
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ + (݌ଵ + ܿ)ߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ  (27) 
96 
 
where c > 0 measures the divergence of the opinions from I and U. 
 Since I assume ݌ଵ
∗ = ݌ଵ
∗∗ = ݌ଵ  and  ݌ଷ
∗ = ݌ଷ
∗∗ = ݌ଷ the magnitude of return around 
news events only depends on the comparison between ݌ଶ
∗  and ݌ଶ
∗∗ . Given ݒ୍ଵ < 0 and 
σ୍ଵ
ଶ =
஢బ
మ஢಍మ
஢బ
మା஢಍
మ < σ଴
ଶ,  I have: 
݌ଶ
∗ − ݌ଶ
∗∗ =
1
2
×
ܿߪగ
ଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ −
1
2
×
ܿߪగ
ଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ =  
ܿߪగ
ଶ
2
ቆ
1
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ −
1
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶቇ
>
ܿߪగଶ
2
ቆ
1
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ −
1
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶቇ = 0 
(28) 
Therefore  ݌ଶ
∗ > ݌ଶ
∗∗ and  
ܴ∗(1,2) =
݌ଶ
∗ − ݌ଵ
∗
݌ଵ
∗ >
݌ଶ
∗∗ − ݌ଵ
∗∗
݌ଵ
∗∗ = ܴ
∗∗(1,2), (29) 
ܴ∗(2,3) =
݌ଷ
∗ − ݌ଶ
∗
݌ଶ
∗ <
݌ଷ
∗∗ − ݌ଶ
∗∗
݌ଶ
∗∗ = ܴ
∗∗(2,3). (30) 
And I also have |ܴ∗(1,2)| > |ܴ∗∗(1,2)|  and  |ܴ∗(2,3)| < |ܴ∗∗(2,3)|.  
Similarly, for the subgroup of stocks that lie in the bottom tercile I have  
ܴ∗(1,2) =
݌ଶ
∗ − ݌ଵ
∗
݌ଵ
∗ <
݌ଶ
∗∗ − ݌ଵ
∗∗
݌ଵ
∗∗ = ܴ
∗∗(1,2) (31) 
ܴ∗(2,3) =
݌ଷ
∗ − ݌ଶ
∗
݌ଶ
∗ >
݌ଷ
∗∗ − ݌ଶ
∗∗
݌ଶ
∗∗ = ܴ
∗∗(2,3) (32) 
Since all these returns are negative, again I have |ܴ∗(1,2)| > |ܴ∗∗(1,2)|  and  
|ܴ∗(2,3)| < |ܴ∗∗(2,3)|. More importantly, the results indicate that the difference between 
R∗(1,2) and R∗∗(1,2) is proportional to c, the divergence of opinion between I and U.  
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B. Trading volume around the earnings announcements 
In this section, I investigate the trading volume on the day of earnings 
announcement. Again, I use the subgroup of stocks with the most positive earnings news 
as my starting point, which corresponds to the scenario with following constraints: 
1) ݌ଵ < ݒ,  (previous under valuation)     (20) 
2) ݌ଵ < ݒ + ߨ,  (positive earnings surprise)     (21) 
3) ݒூଵ ≤ ݒ௎ଵ = 0.        (22) 
Based on the model assumptions and previous results, market trading volume at the time 
of earnings announcement can be decomposed into several parts under different 
scenarios: 
Scenario A: All else equal (݌ଵ
∗ = ݌ଵ, ݌ଷ
∗ = ݌ଷ = ݒ  and same public signal ܵߨ), I 
and U agree with each other on date 1 (ݒூଵ
∗ = ݒ௎ଵ
∗ = ݌ଵ). Since I and U agree with each 
other, Uc trades. Market trading volume is the sum of  ݔ෤ଶ, ݑ෤ଶ and ݑ෤௖ଶ, where  
ݔଶ
∗ =
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
(ݒூଶ
∗ − ݒ௎ଶ
∗ ) =
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
(
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగ
ଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ −
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగ
ଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ ) (33) 
 ݑ෤ଶ~ܰ (0, ߪ଴
ଶ)  and  ݑ෤௖ଶ~ܰ (0, ߪ௖ଶ).  
Scenario B: All else equal (݌ଵ
∗∗ = ݌ଵ, ݌ଷ
∗∗ = ݌ଷ = ݒ  and same public signal ܵߨ), I 
and U disagree with each other (ݒூଵ ≠ ݒ௎ଵ ). 
When I and U disagree with each other, Uc does not trade. Market trading volume 
is the sum of  ݔ෤ଶ and  ݑ෤ଶ, where  
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ݔଶ
∗∗ =
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
(ݒூଶ
∗∗ − ݒ௎ଶ
∗∗ )
=
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
(
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + (݌ଵ − ܿ)ߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ −
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ + (݌ଵ + ܿ)ߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ ) 
(34) 
and ݑ෤ଶ~ܰ (0, ߪ଴
ଶ).  
 First I prove ݔଶ
∗ > ݔଶ
∗∗ by showing that: 
ݔଶ
∗ − ݔଶ
∗∗ =
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
ቆ
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ −
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ ቇ
−
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
ቆ
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + (݌ଵ − ܿ)ߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ −
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ + (݌ଵ + ܿ)ߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ ቇ
=
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
ቆ
ܿߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ +
ܿߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶቇ > 0 
(35) 
Then I examine the sign of ݔଶ
∗. Defining ܺଶ(ߪଶ) =
(௩ାగ)ఙమା௣భఙഏమ
ఙഏ
మାఙమ
, I calculate: 
ܺଶ
ᇱ(ߪଶ) =
(ݒ + ߨ)(ߪగଶ + ߪଶ) − ((ݒ + ߨ)ߪଶ + ݌ଵߪగଶ)
(ߪగଶ + ߪଶ)ଶ
=
(ݒ + ߨ − ݌ଵ)ߪగଶ
(ߪగଶ + ߪଶ)ଶ
 (36) 
According to equation (21) we know that ݌ଵ < ݒ + ߨ, therefore ܺଶ
ᇱ(ߪଶ) > 0. So 
ݔଶ
∗ =
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
ቆ
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪூଵ
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪூଵ
ଶ −
(ݒ + ߨ)ߪ଴
ଶ + ݌ଵߪగଶ
ߪగଶ + ߪ଴
ଶ ቇ =
ߪ଴
ߪூଶ
൫݂(ߪூଵ
ଶ ) − ݂(ߪ଴
ଶ)൯ < 0 (37) 
Given 
σூଵ
ଶ =
σ଴
ଶσகଶ
σ଴
ଶ + σகଶ
< σ଴
ଶ (37) 
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Since I already proved ݔଶ
∗ > ݔଶ
∗∗, therefore  ݔଶ
∗∗ < 0 and the size of trade |ݔଶ
∗| <
|ݔଶ
∗∗|. Similarly, for the subgroup of stocks that have the most negative earnings surprise, 
it can be proved that |ݔଶ
∗| < |ݔଶ
∗∗|. 
Overall, I have shown that when I and U have different opinions, I tend to trade 
more in order to maximize his trading profit. However, Uc will trade ݑ෤௖ଶ only when I and 
U agree with each other, which will increase the overall trading volume under scenario A. 
Therefore, whether the divergence of opinion will increase or decrease aggregate trading 
volume is not clear from my model implication. The actual net effect of |ݔଶ
∗| − |ݔଶ
∗∗| plus 
|ݑ෤௖ଶ| needs to be examined empirically. 
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APPENDIX 2:  MODEL STRUCTURE 
 
Panel A. Investor expectations 
 Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 
Event ݒ෤ is realized Private Signal SI Public Signal Sp Asset liquidated 
Uninformed trader ܰ (0, ߪ଴ଶ) ܰ (0, ߪ଴ଶ) ܰ (ݒ௎ଶ, ߪ௎ଶଶ ) ݒ 
Discretionary uninformed trader ܰ (0, ߪ଴ଶ) ܰ (0, ߪ଴ଶ) ܰ (ݒ௎ଶ, ߪ௎௖ଶଶ ) ݒ 
Informed trader ܰ (0, ߪ଴
ଶ) ܰ (ݒூଵ , ߪூଵ
ଶ ) ܰ (ݒூଶ , ߪூଶ
ଶ ) ݒ 
 
Panel B. Trading activity 
 Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 
Event ݒ෤ is realized (ݒ෤ = ݒ) I receive private signal SI Public signal Sp arrives Asset liquidated 
Uninformed trader NA  ݑ෥ ଵ~ܰ(0, ߪ௨
ଶ)  ݑ෥ ଶ~ܰ(0, ߪ௨
ଶ) NA 
Discretionary uninformed trader NA 0  ݑ෥ ௖ଶ~ܰ(0, ߪ௖ଶ) or 0 NA 
Informed trader NA ݔ෤ଵ = ܺଵ(ܵூ) ݔ෤ଶ = ܺଶ(ܵூ, ܵ௣) NA 
Price set by Market Maker ଴ܲ = 0 ଵܲ = ܧ{ݒ෤ூଵ|ݔ෤ଵ + ݑ෤ଵ } ଶܲ = ܧ൛ݒ෤ூଶหݔ෤ଶ + ݑ෤ଶ + ݑ෤ ୡଶ , ܵ௣ൟ ଷܲ = ݒ 
 
